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Relational Contracts of Adhesion
David A. Hoffman†
Not all digital fine print exculpates liability: some exhorts users to perform
before the consumer relationship has soured. We promise to choose strong passwords
(and hold them private); to behave civilly on social networks; to refrain from streaming shows and sports; and to avoid reverse-engineering code (or, worse, deploying
deadly bots). In short, consumers are apparently regulated by digital fine print,
though it’s universally assumed that we don’t read it and, even if we did, that we’ll
never be sued for failing to perform.
On reflection, this ordinary phenomenon is perplexing. Why would firms persist in deploying uncommunicative behavioral spurs? The conventional answer is
that fine print acts as an option, drafted by dull, guild-captured lawyers. Through
investigation of several sharing-economy firms and discussions with a variety of
lawyers in this space, I show that this account is incomplete. Indeed, I identify and
explore examples of fine print from sharing-economy firms that seem intended to
actually communicate with and manage users.
The drafters of these clauses claim that they successfully deployed the fine print
by trading on their brands and identities and by giving up on certain exculpatory
defenses. I argue that the resulting terms may point toward a new form of relational
contracting, taking on attributes of both mass adhesion contracts and longer-term
deals.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumer contract theory is myopically focused on the unread fine print.1 Because consumers don’t read their contracts,2
firms can make “hidden” terms worse without lowering prices.3 At
best, the platonic consumer contract is read by exactly two people,
both lawyers: the drafter curating it from the carcasses of past
agreements4 and the plaintiff’s counsel, immediately before explaining to an injured client that her case is hopeless.5 Yet perversely, when judges and juries evaluate terms ex post, they

1
For the modern classic treatment, see Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz, The NoReading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan L Rev 545, 558–60 (2014).
2
See, for example, Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R.
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form
Contracts, 43 J Legal Stud 1, 19 (2014) (finding that, in a study of visits to software retailers’ websites, consumers accessed end-user license agreements (EULAs) 0.08 percent of
the time).
3
See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J Inst &
Theoretical Econ 94, 113–14 (2012) (finding that exposure to a one-sided term in a
software license agreement has no effect on the likelihood of purchasing the product in
question); Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U Chi L
Rev 1263, 1315–17 (2011) (explaining the concern that insurance companies “exploit[ ]
consumer ignorance to ratchet back coverage” without corresponding discounts).
4
See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 NYU L Rev 240, 247 (2013) (discussing the process of consumer contract creation, through which in-house counsel is best
positioned to revise boilerplate language and language taken from other firms).
5
In reality, many consumers complain to firms without the benefit of counsel (because the stakes of the dispute are low). In such instances, the corporation may create its
own idiosyncratic dispute resolution system. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as
Courthouse, 33 Yale J Reg 547, 558–66 (2016) (explaining predominant aspects of corporate dispute resolution systems); Lisa Bernstein and Hagay Volvovsky, Not What You
Wanted to Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal in Consumer Contracts—Comment on
the Work of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 11 Jerusalem Rev Legal Stud 128, 130–32 (2015)
(explaining that companies’ actual practices for resolving consumer complaints can differ
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blame consumers for failing to exercise care and hold them to
their deals.6 The result is a legitimacy crisis that generates much
modern contracts scholarship.7
But even as this account has settled into the new, cynical,
conventional wisdom, a new form is arising. The modern consumer experience now includes participation in the creation of
goods and services.8 Firms enlist consumers in building intellectual property. They ask us to review goods and services, and use

from their formal policies in ways that have the effect of avoiding litigation); Jason Scott
Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts
Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 Mich L Rev 857,
865 (2006) (highlighting corporations’ use of employee discretion in departing from formal
contractual terms).
6
See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99
Iowa L Rev 1745, 1764–65 (2014) (presenting results of an experiment in which subjects
often blamed consumers for failing to read bad terms).
7
See, for example, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing
Standard Terms, 103 Cornell L Rev 117, 124–26 (2017) (discussing various doctrinal approaches to the no-reading problem); David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How
Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 NYU L Rev 1595, 1597 (2016) (characterizing
digital contracts as sterile and frequently the subject of satire); Nathan B. Oman, The
Dignity of Commerce: Markets and the Moral Foundations of Contract Law 134–59
(Chicago 2016) (considering arguments regarding consent for consumer boilerplate and
concluding that policing on substance, not process, is desirable); Omri Ben-Shahar, Book
Review, Regulating through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 Mich L Rev 883, 900–01 (2014)
(highlighting distributive problems with “protective policies” meant to replace boilerplate
contracts); Oren Bar-Gill and Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond,
97 Cornell L Rev 967, 1003 (2012) (advocating for new and better disclosure regimes, including aggregated fee information, which the consumer can better assess); Zev J. Eigen,
Experimental Evidence of the Relationship between Reading the Fine Print and
Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 124, 134 (2012) (citing the “low stakes of the exchange” as one of the “typical” explanations of low readership);
Victoria C. Plaut and Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 L & Hum Behav 293,
305–06 (2012) (exploring the relationship between lack of readership and assent to contractual provisions); Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U Pa L Rev 647, 704–11 (2011) (exploring the problem of no-reading); Oren
Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S Cal L Rev 1, 19–26 (2010) (articulating
problems caused by unilateral modification clauses); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,
98 Nw U L Rev 1373, 1417–20 (2004) (advocating for consumer-friendly modifications to
credit card fee disclosure policies).
8
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law and
How to Reinvent It for a Complex Global Economy 154 (Oxford 2017) (discussing the complexity of monitoring copying of digital information, such as music and videos, when the
“boundary between who is a supplier and who is a consumer dissolves,” and how relaxed
restrictions on copying can enable consumers to become creators). The question of labeling
users of sharing economy sites as “consumers” is intensely contested. See Ryan Calo and
Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 Colum L Rev
1623, 1660 (2017) (arguing that labeling drivers as consumers is part of Uber’s strategy of
exploiting them).
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those reviews in driving future sales. Platforms match users with
each other, seeking to disintermediate established transportation
and distribution networks.9 Overall, consumer agency, not passivity, is the rhetoric, if not the reality, of the “sharing economy.”10
The evolution of consumers into participants has implications for contract law. Indeed, it is contract that makes the transmutation possible. Our economy is now shaped in part by the success and failure of terms that don’t just exculpate firms from
liability, but also express the drafters’ hopes about how users will
behave. In part through the fine print, firms may aim to influence
consumers’ performance before the parties’ interests become adverse. That is, consumer contracts can’t be described as merely
containing unfair and defensive hidden terms: they also contain
a set of instructions, what I call “precatory fine print.”11
Precatory fine print is distinctive from its aversive and defensive cousin. Unlike a clause defeating class action practice or one
disclaiming consequential damages, precatory terms are not primarily intended to have legal effect. Indeed, in the rare instances
that firms seek to enforce clauses in the courts of law, they get
into trouble.12 Consider the example of streaming media online.
Firms often use boilerplate to try to extend their intellectual property rights—for example, by prohibiting consumers from asserting fair use under circumstances in which the prevailing law

9
In this Article, I generally use “consumer” to refer to users of platform economy
sites, though those individuals may be either buyers or sellers. See Hadfield, Rules for a
Flat World at 154 (cited in note 8).
10 The literature on the sharing economy is vast. For a useful recent survey, see Calo
and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1641–45 (cited in note 8) (describing the promise of
the sharing economy).
11 The use of the term “precatory” to describe consumer contracts’ terms of use is
novel in published literature, though I did hear Professor Pamela Samuelson use it in a
conference I attended.
12 Apart from the no-review example I give in this Article, the widely mocked, and
largely unsuccessful, attempt to use precatory terms of use as the basis for violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213, codified at 18 USC § 1001
et seq, provides both a cautionary tale and evidence of the point. As the leading commentator
on the statute argued, the prosecution was problematic in part because “Internet users routinely click through such agreements on the assumption that they are legal mumbo jumbo
that don’t impact what users are allowed to do.” Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn L Rev 1561, 1582 (2010).
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would permit it.13 Though controversial among academics, these
clauses are rarely, if ever, enforced against consumers.14
A different way to think about these clauses is behavioral:
content providers hope to influence how their users interact with
their intellectual property.15 Take a single example: HBO Go. For
those who, for whatever reason, are not Game of Thrones fans and
consequently don’t subscribe,16 HBO Go enables users to stream
the channel’s programs to their screen, untethered to their cable
connection. Obviously, HBO is concerned that users might expand the scope of the license in various ways. It expresses that
concern in a contract term, buried in a 7,100-plus-word terms of
use. The seventh section is titled “RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF
MATERIALS.”17 To save space, I’ve cut out some words. Still, the
mind reels:
(a) You may not copy, reproduce, distribute, transfer, sell, license, publish, enter into a database, display, perform publicly, modify, create derivative works, upload, edit, post, link
to, frame, transmit, rent, lease, lend or sublicense or in any
way exploit any part of the Services, or attempt to interfere
with the operation of the Services in any way, except that you
may access and display material and all other Content displayed on the Services for non-commercial, personal, entertainment use for a limited time only as strictly authorized

13 See Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict,
103 Va L Rev 1141, 1198, 1203 (2017) (describing common “super-copyright” contractual
provisions that preclude fair use of copyrighted material).
14 See id at 1197–1204 (analyzing 279 cases in which contract claims were asserted
and finding no consumer defendants). For discussion of these controversial clauses, see
Guy A. Rub, Contracting around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of Rights in
Creative Works, 78 U Chi L Rev 257, 277 (2011) (discussing possible costs of fair use–
restricting contracts to “transformative users”); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn
L Rev 459 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand L Rev 1799,
1805 (2000) (describing a “growing body of copyright scholarship” advocating “the freedom
to contract around copyright limitations such as . . . the fair use doctrine”); David Nimmer,
Elliot Brown, and Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Cal
L Rev 17, 74 (1999) (arguing that license provisions that impermissibly restrict fair use
rights should be invalid).
15 See Zev J. Eigen, An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions
*3 (Northwestern Law & Economics Research Paper No 13-32), archived at
http://perma.cc/7D9Y-ZB7K.
16 This is a mistake, even if George R.R. Martin will never, ever finish writing the
series. See Hoffman, 91 NYU L Rev at 1599 n 15 (cited in note 7) (explaining the problem
of fantasy authors promising too much).
17 HBO Go Terms (HBO Go, Apr 3, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/NUR5
-DCYX?type=image.
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herein. You may not use any data mining, robots, or similar
data gathering and extraction tools on the Services or on any
portion of the Service, or frame any portion of the Service.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, you may not
distribute any part of the Services over any network, including a local area network, nor sell or offer it for sale. You may
not assign, sublicense, pledge or transfer any of your rights
or obligations under this Agreement to any person or entity
without HBO’s prior written consent which may be withheld
in HBO’s sole discretion (and any such purposed assignment,
pledge or transfer without such prior written consent shall
be void ab initio). In addition, these files may not be used to
construct any kind of database. . . . Using any material on
any other Service or networked computer environment is prohibited. Also prohibited are: decompiling, reverse engineering, disassembling, or otherwise reducing the code used in
any software or digital rights management feature on the
Services into a readable form in order to examine the construction of such software and/or to copy or create other products based (in whole or in part) on such software or any feature of the Services, or intercepting and/or recording network
communications transmitted between the Services and
HBO. . . . (c) HBO and its partners and affiliates may suspend
or terminate your subscription and access to the Services immediately if HBO reasonably determines that you are in violation of this Agreement or receives information that you no
longer meet the Eligibility Criteria. In such event, you must
cease all use of the Services. The suspension or termination
of your subscription is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
rights and remedies available to HBO, its partners and affiliates under this Agreement or under applicable laws.18
Let’s stipulate that the only nonlawyer in the history of the
world who read that entire “paragraph” was the poor 2L student
who checked it for accuracy.19 If you feel shamed by the last sentence and resolve to go back and really read it this time, you
would find that HBO’s customers promise to do all sorts of things
they will not be sued for failing to do, including watching Cersei

18
19

Id.
Sorry not sorry.
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Lannister burn her enemies over a local area network.20 Yet it is
impossible to imagine that any ordinary consumer would be
tempted to read this exhortation or, having read it, change her
behavior.21 And for a small yet significant class of consumers,
these warnings may even encourage unlicensed activity.22
What, then, is the point of precatory fine print? When
pressed, some argue that it offers firms a sort of option value. It’s
not as if firms hope to enforce terms either in or out of court. Rather, the terms provide rights to be exercised rarely—that is,
when consumers act in highly disruptive ways.23 This opportunistic account dominates discussions not just of exculpatory consumer contract clauses but also of precatory ones. In effect, most
scholars think of precatory clauses as little more than exculpatory
clauses occasionally enforced through demand letters and algorithmic moderators instead of motions to dismiss. Accordingly,
precatory fine print is rarely the subject of distinct law review
treatments.24
20 Admit it, you got bored and stopped reading. And I excised around 100 words from
the middle just to make it easier for you.
21 See Jenna Wortham, The Unrepentant Bootlegger (NY Times Sept 27, 2014), online
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/technology/the-unrepentant-bootlegger.html (visited
Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
22 See Eigen, An Experimental Test at *22–23 (cited in note 15) (finding that terms
and conditions induced more cheating than other forms of behavioral modification).
23 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich L Rev 827, 833–34 (2006) (describing how firms
“dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them to do” in response to consumer expectations).
24 The best paper in this field is an unpublished experimental piece by Zev Eigen.
Eigen, An Experimental Test at *3–7 (cited in note 15) (arguing that firms wrongly use
terms and conditions to attempt to reduce digital piracy). Other good related work includes
Danielle Keats Citron, Online Engagement on Equal Terms, BU L Rev Online (Oct 19,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SVY6-HTFX (showing that Twitter, for instance, has
increased the number of demands it makes on consumers over the years); M. Ryan Calo,
Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame L Rev 1027, 1057–
58 (2012) (suggesting that the existence of a website privacy policy may influence consumer behavior even if it is not read); Danielle Keats Citron and Helen Norton,
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age,
91 BU L Rev 1435, 1440, 1478–79 (2011) (suggesting that intermediaries can use terms of
service to civilize internet behavior); Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60
Am U L Rev 1635, 1650–53 (2011) (arguing for a design-centered contract law that recognizes that elements of a website’s design can constitute a promise); Joshua A.T. Fairfield,
Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 McGill L J 427,
435–38 (2008) (discussing the use of EULAs to govern virtual worlds); Lee Anne Fennell,
Contracting Communities, 2004 U Ill L Rev 829, 884–90 (discussing residential community contracts). There is also a literature on the relationship of criminal sanctions to contract terms, which appears to take the standard line. For example, see Orin S. Kerr,
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse
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This option account proves too little. Descriptively, in many
industries the value for the “option” would be vanishingly low, as
the reputational costs for triggering it would be exceptionally
high.25 Moreover, even if firms want to preserve their ex post options, why have they done so through a communicative medium
that’s famously unread? Why haven’t they innovated to find ways
to both corral their customers ex ante and also preserve their flexibility ex post?
Some have argued that the current look and feel of the fine
print is evidence of a market failure resulting from a monopoly:
the organized bar. As imperfect—and badly trained—agents,
lawyers simply can’t solve clients’ consumer contracting problems
and repeatedly turn to the tools closest at hand.26 In other words:
the fine print looks the way it does because lawyers have failed to
innovate even though innovation would be valuable for their
clients. Thus, we will have communicative contracts only in a
world in which the gates around the profession are breached, and
lawyers can join hands with accountants and engineers to build
better forms.
This story is also incomplete. In this Article, I challenge the
conventional wisdom by providing examples of mass-market
terms that seem to really influence user behavior outside of court.
I do so through a series of interview-generated case studies of the
user agreements from prominent new-economy firms, including
Etsy, Airbnb, Tumblr, and Kickstarter. This is good news: it may
suggest a distinct way forward in our understanding of the future
of contracting online. Firms can innovate in this space, if they
want to, and lawyers can help them do so.

Statutes, 78 NYU L Rev 1596, 1659 (2003) (criticizing regulation by contractual terms of
use in part because they are widely known to be unread and unclear).
25 The Recording Industry Association of America, for example, abandoned its campaign to sue users for downloading music after it became a “public-relations disaster.”
Sarah McBride and Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits (Wall St J, Dec
19, 2008), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122966038836021137 (visited Mar 31,
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). Even threats to sue can be disastrous. The “Streisand
Effect” was a term coined by Mike Masnick in 2005 to explain how attempts to remove
information from the internet frequently cause that information to become even more salient. See Mike Masnick, For 10 Years Everyone’s Been Using “The Streisand Effect” without Paying; Now I’m Going to Start Issuing Takedowns (TechDirt, Jan 8, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/4WMX-2VYT.
26 See Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 228–37 (cited in note 8) (blaming the bar
monopoly for law schools’ and lawyers’ failure to innovate around terms); Eigen, An
Experimental Test at *3–5 (cited in note 15) (noting lawyers’ risk aversion as a driver of
the failure to innovate).
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Close inspection of these innovative agreements suggests
they might represent a new form of contracting, which I call “relational contracts of adhesion.” Unlike firms deploying typical,
adhesive, mass-consumer contracts, these new firms actively try
to motivate readership. In so doing, they hope to govern ex ante
behavior without recourse to court sanctions, do not inevitably
seize every advantage, harmonize the look and feel of the terms
with their larger brands as an aspect of trade dress, and have
seemingly succeeded in creating mass-market forms that have
some of the attributes of “real” contracts. They are thus relational.
But unlike traditional relational contracts between firms,
these contracts are not negotiated, the parties are at best loosely
bound, and the users are both merchants and consumers at the
same time. That is, successful precatory terms are neither fish
nor fowl: they take on aspects of both the fabled past of individualized contracting and the cynical present of exploitative standard terms. On the whole, my description of relational contracts of
adhesion challenges the prevailing account of consumer contracting in the sharing economy, which is typically focused on its dystopian and exploitative aspects.27
This Article thus has several goals. First, I want to carve out
precatory terms in adhesion contracts as the objects of study.
Though consumer contracts have been discussed at length for decades, the degree to which they contain language that purports to
persuade rather than compel has been largely ignored by contract
theorists. Part I of this Article provides some examples of precatory terms in their fine-print context, and Part II pieces together
the standard account for their continued existence. But the standard account is unconvincing. Part III offers a series of case study
examples, based on interviews with market players, of precatory
terms that seem to be functional in motivating user behavior outside of court. Part IV offers a theory that knits together these case
studies and suggests that they illustrate a distinct form of relational contracting. The conditions giving rise to these contracts
may suggest the need for different forms of government intervention in the sharing economy.

27 See, for example, Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1660–61 (cited in note
8) (arguing that contracting is a way that firms like Uber exploit their drivers).
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I. PRECATORY TERMS BRIEFLY DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED
To start, I confess to using the word precatory in an idiosyncratic sense. Ordinarily, precatory legal language has no legal effect at all28—for example, a clause in a will expressing the testator’s desires about her pet’s care.29 But some of the fine print I
describe is in theory enforceable in court. For the purposes of this
Article, I define precatory fine print as language in a massmarket contract that (1) is exceedingly unlikely to be enforced in
court; (2) purports to govern the user’s conduct outside of the decision to purchase; and (3) introduces terms that the firm would
like, all else equal, to see performed.
I have already mentioned that intellectual property contracts
are paradigmatic examples of precatory terms. These are both
omnipresent and never enforced against consumers.30 Perhaps because of that lack of enforcement, there is little evidence that any
consumer has been motivated by the terms and conditions of licensed intellectual property to avoid copying.31 It’s a puzzle. Here
is a field in which the firm-side demand to regulate consumers—
to have them behave differently—is high. However, though the
underlying firms are innovative and dynamic players in a rapidly
changing market, they have settled on a particularly inane strategy. Each imposes boilerplate prohibitions that are as hard to understand as they are to read from beginning to end.
Other precatory terms purport to control consumer speech,
creating a “sort of jurisprudence” for all speech acts on a particular platform.32 Indeed, as Professor Jeffrey Rosen has observed,
consumer contracts seem to give the employees of digital companies “more power over who gets heard around the globe than any

28 Black’s Law Dictionary 1366 (10th ed 2014) (defining “precatory word[s]” as “expressions of requests, desires, or recommendations, as distinguished from commands” and noting
that “[g]enerally, precatory words are not recognized as legally enforceable instructions”).
29 See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of
Precatory Words in Wills, 22 Wis Women’s L J 1, 16 (2007) (describing precatory language
in wills concerning pets).
30 Rub, 103 Va L Rev at 1184–91 (cited in note 13) (discussing the set of doctrinal
and practical hurdles to using contracts to enforce anticopying rules).
31 See id at 1198.
32 Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of
Google and Twitter, 127 Harv L Rev 2259, 2273 (2014), quoting Somini Sengupta, Twitter
Yields to Pressure in Hate Case in France (NY Times, July 12, 2013), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/technology/twitter-yields-to-pressure-in-hate-case-in
-france.html (visited Apr 11, 2018) (Perma link unavailable).
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politician or bureaucrat—more power, in fact, than any president
or judge.”33
The easiest example to parse is a digital media site that prohibits, using a contract, certain kinds of comments on news stories. Breitbart News, a site that we might not ordinarily associate
with civility, enjoins its users with a long list of ways that they
may not interact with the webpage, all in boilerplate form. For
example, users agree not to:
use the Services in any way that abuses, defames, stalks, annoys, threatens, harasses or violates the rights of privacy,
publicity, intellectual property or other legal rights of a person or entity (now or hereafter recognized) or which encourages conduct which would violate any law or give rise to civil
or criminal liability or post, publish, transmit, distribute, disseminate or upload any inappropriate, infringing, defamatory, profane, indecent, obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent or illegal/unlawful material or matters,
including, without limitation, information, topics, names or
other material;
...
[provide user content that] degrades others on the basis of
gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual preference, orientation or identity, disability, or other
classification.34
A related attempt to control user behavior occurs when firms
that sell goods to the public attempt to control their “community’s” behavior on the firm’s own site. That behavior’s locus is
typically user reviews. Firms actively monitor and moderate reviews ex post, but they also attempt to shape them ex ante

33 Jeffrey Rosen, This Hate Has Been Removed by the Administrator, New Republic
22 (May 13, 2013). See also Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled
Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 Notre Dame L Rev 1035, 1038 (2018) (describing
transnational problems of private speech in TOS enforcement). See also generally Kate
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech,
131 Harv L Rev 1598 (2018) (describing content moderation).
34 Terms of Use (Breitbart, June 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5CLE-TY27.
As some have pointed out, universities also try to control speech using contract. See Robert
H. Jerry II and Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.1: Public Higher Education Institutions
and Social Media, 14 Fla Coastal L Rev 55, 80–88 (2012) (discussing various universities’
use of customized social media terms and conditions to attempt to set discursive norms).
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through the terms of use. For example, Lululemon’s website’s
8,816-word terms of use include the user’s agreement to avoid
comments that “defame, abuse, harass, stalk, threaten, or otherwise violate the legal rights (such as rights of privacy and
publicity) of others”; the use of “racially, ethnically, or otherwise
offensive language”; or posting anything “that depicts cruelty to
animals.”35 Birchbox, which provides beauty products on a subscription basis, prohibits (in the tenth section of its website’s
svelte 5,172-word terms and conditions) “unduly critical or spiteful comments of other content posted on the page or its authors.”36
A different problem is posed when parties aggrieved by a
firm’s services comment on third-party sites. A single negative review may have disproportionately large effects on goodwill.37
Here, obviously, the firm can’t easily resort to self-help by simply
removing the offending comment. In response, starting in the
mid-2000s, businesses turned to the fine print: clauses in consumer contracts telling users not to negatively review their products, sometimes enforced through penalty damages.38 Such
clauses (which often backfired against their drafters) are now unenforceable, following the passage of the Consumer Review
Fairness Act39 making all anti-review contract clauses void.40 That
federal law was passed after the election of President Donald
Trump and signed by President Barack Obama in his waning
days in office. The Act, enacted at a moment when political tensions were at a historical apogee, evidences our nearly universal
disdain for the fine print.41
A final set of examples comes from the platform economy.
Many platform firms attempt to control users’ ability to share a
35

Terms of Use (Lululemon, Sept 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8LBL-KRGR.
Terms and Conditions (Birchbox, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BGN5-NY2Y.
37 Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer “Gag”
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 59,
92 (2016) (“[T]he posting of a single negative review online could cause business revenues
to plummet about 25 percent or more.”).
38 See Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24
Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 1, 2–4 (2017) (describing the history of antireview clauses and
explaining that some firms use these clauses to impose monetary fines on consumers).
39 Pub L No 114-258, 130 Stat 1355 (2016), codified at 15 USC § 45b.
40 15 USC § 45b.
41 Professor Danielle Citron prompts me to wonder whether the rejection of review
clauses is instead an illustration of our free speech tradition. See Danielle Keats Citron,
Hate Crimes in Cyberspace 199–218 (Harvard 2016) (discussing various forms of cyber
harassment in the context of the First Amendment). Yet the absence of a similar public
outcry against common confidentiality clauses, which are more seriously negotiated but
which cause similar deprivation of market-relevant information, seems telling.
36
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single user account with multiple individuals. LinkedIn’s User
Agreement, for instance, requires that adherents: “(1) try to
choose a strong and secure password; (2) keep your password secure and confidential; (3) not transfer any part of your account
(e.g., connections) and (4) follow the law and our list of Dos and
Don’ts.”42 Those Dos and Don’ts include an injunction whereby users promise to “[p]rovide accurate information to us and keep it
updated.”43
A different kind of term appears to try to control offline customer behavior. Zipcar, for instance, permits its users (who, essentially, rent cars) to drive for services like Lyft and Uber. But,
bizarrely, it attempts to use contract to control whom users
transport. As its Membership Contract states, “It is prohibited to
use a Zipcar vehicle for the transportation of third party goods for
payment such as, but not limited to, providing courier or delivery
services. In addition, it is prohibited to transport professional
sports persons or professional entertainers in a Zipcar vehicle.”44
The backstory of that provision would be interesting to
learn.45 However, it’s not unique: firms routinely enlist contract
to try to control user behavior in ways that might mitigate their
business risk but provide few additional legal protections.
Feastly, a site that matches meal preparers with those who want
to eat, makes the chefs promise not to “violate any local, state,
provincial, national, or other law or regulation, or any order of a
court, including, without limitation, zoning restrictions.”46
TaskRabbit, which matches the handy with the not, prohibits
posting tasks that require users to cross state lines.47 Instacart,
which fills your fridge, makes customers promise that they will
42 User Agreement (LinkedIn, June 7, 2017), online at http://www.linkedin.com/
legal/user-agreement (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
43 Id.
44 Zipcar Membership Contract—Floating Model (Zipcar Belgium, Aug 19, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/BZL3-WKAH.
45 Avis, which owns Zipcar, has a different structure to its terms and conditions.
First, it conditions assent to its use clause on an exclusion from Avis’s insurance and an
immediate termination of the rental. Rental Terms and Conditions: United States and
Canada *4 (Avis, Apr 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5NCC-FGXR. Second, the use
clause prohibits using the car to “carry passengers . . . for hire,” a use permitted by Zipcar.
Id at *5. That is, if I were to drive Beyoncé to a concert for free, I’d violate Zipcar’s terms
of use, but not Avis’s. If I charged her, I’d violate both provisions. If I ferried one of
Beyoncé’s fans home at a price, I’d violate Avis’s but not Zipcar’s terms. The likelihood
that this parsing is apparent to anyone in the world ex ante is vanishingly low.
46 Terms and Conditions (Feastly, Oct 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/289E-6TZ9.
47 TaskRabbit Terms of Service (TaskRabbit, Mar 1, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/5CW4-94A8.
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not be intoxicated when they receive alcohol from the site.48 Box,
which provides file storage, requires users to avoid “use in connection with any purposes or intended application which involves
risks or dangers that could lead to death, serious bodily injury,
severe physical or property damage, or . . . in connection with operation of . . . nuclear facilities.”49
In considering each of these examples, we should ask: If firms
really want consumers to do the things they are asking them to
do, why would they use mass-market fine print to communicate
their goals? And if they actually don’t care if consumers listen,
why bother writing such terms at all?
II. STANDARD ACCOUNTS FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF PRECATORY
FINE PRINT
This Part considers the standard explanations for precatory
fine print in the modern economy and finds them, in the end, incomplete. I start with some hopefully uncontroversial propositions about the relationship between terms and behavior.
A.

Commercial Terms and Contract Behavior

In some contexts, it is axiomatic that terms govern performance.50 Why else would they exist?51 The normal science of the
economic analysis of contract focuses on the effect of different
terms on different levels of effort: parties take greater precautions
against breach when damages are higher; they are more likely to

48

Terms and Conditions (Instacart, Aug 2, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6EBV

-LHAF.
49 Box Terms of Service (Box, Aug 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/UX42-NZQ9. Notably, another product with the similar name of DropBox Inc does offer services directly to
nuclear facilities, by way of a large, metal toilet. DropBox Inc. and the Sanitation Station.
Portable Restroom Trailers (Sept 28, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/6KCR-QYBQ.
50 For an illustrative paper, see generally Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L J 541 (2003). Schwartz and
Scott discuss an efficiency theory of firm-firm contracting, pointing out that court involvement would be limited as most contracts would be self-enforcing. Id at 556–59. It’s just as
axiomatic that marking the parties’ obligations isn’t the only thing that “contract” does.
See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L & Society Rev 91, 91 (2003)
(“Contracts are many things to many people.”).
51 See Suchman, 37 L & Society Rev at 112 (cited in note 50) (providing an account
of contract as a “significant gesture” that “allow[s] transacting parties to communicate
messages to one another or to third-party observers”).
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perform when terms are clearly expressed; etc.52 Between firms,
terms matter.53
In the consumer sphere, by contrast, most (if not all) of the
extant theoretical work on the behavioral effect of terms is explicitly posed as hypothetical at best.54 True, data from lab experiments do suggest that terms—when read—can influence behavior.55 But, excepting warranties,56 terms are almost never
52 For examples and lucid analysis, see Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The
Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 Va L Rev 1523, 1577–85 (2016).
53 This is not to say that each term is perfectly performed or that legal sanctions are
necessary, as reputational concerns play important roles. For example, see Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules,
Norms and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724, 1767 (2001) (describing the role of trade
associations in creating effective reputational constraints); Stewart Macaulay, NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am Sociological Rev 55, 63–
65 (1963) (discussing reputation-based “non-legal sanctions” that often take the place of
formal contract terms).
54 See, for example, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach:
New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va L Rev 1939, 1954–55 n 32 (2011) (arguing
that firms are more likely to maximize monetary returns in contracts than individuals);
Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J Inst &
Theoretical Econ 142, 145 (2004) (imagining a world of “efficacious” consumer contracts).
55 See Stanislav Mamonov and Raquel Benbunan-Fich, An Empirical Investigation
of Privacy Breach Perceptions among Smartphone Application Users, 49 Computers Hum
Behav 427, 432–33 (2015) (finding that the presence of legal permissions in TOS reduced
smartphone users’ perceptions of privacy breach but finding no significant age effects in
sample of approximately 200 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects); David A. Hoffman and
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U Chi L Rev 395, 418–
19 (2013) (finding, based on survey results, that people are more likely to protect their
interests against a prospective contractual counterparty than an actual contractual counterparty and proposing psychological explanations); Eigen, 168 J Inst & Theoretical Econ
at 135–36 (cited in note 7); Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual
Obligations Created Equal?, 100 Georgetown L J 5, 31 (2011) (“The content of contracts,
notwithstanding the legal price of breach, induces compliance.”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do
Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich L Rev 633,
665 (2010) (concluding that “the presence of a liquidated-damages clause in a contract
reduces [moral] qualms and, in turn, encourages breach”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and
Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J
Empirical Legal Stud 405, 420–21 (2009) (finding that subjects exhibited greater moral
disapproval and awarded greater damages for efficient breaches as compared with
breaches to avoid a loss). But see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz and Matthew B. Kugler, Is
Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J Legal Stud S69, S76–77 (2016)
(reporting survey findings that users do not consider differences in privacy policy language
relevant to whether they have authorized websites to collect personal information).
56 In many market segments, warranties are subject to strong market forces. See
Yair Listokin, The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J Legal Analysis
397, 406–10 (2010) (reporting findings that consumers correctly priced variations in
warranty language); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
Yale L J 1297, 1347 (1981) (“[T]he allocation of responsibilities . . . by standardized warranties is responsive to consumer preferences, and establishes coherent economic
incentives for manufacturer and consumer investments.”). The two leading Federal Trade
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read.57 Thus, although contracting terms are in theory part of the
consumer products that they regulate,58 studies have shown that
they are not typically amenable to competitive pressures.59
Perhaps, some argue, precatory terms influence behavior
through a more indirect route. There is evidence that individuals
experience contracting as a ritual with some latent power, which
tends to legitimate terms even when they are not read. As
Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan puts it, “[A] policy’s inclusion in
a form contract may reduce the likelihood that consumers will
challenge a practice using market power, informal dispute mechanisms, the court system, or the political process.”60 The very act
of consent “may remind the poster of the legally binding nature

Commission studies on warranty readership (though dated) find that, generally, between
20 and 30 percent of consumers read warranties before they purchased a good, and between 50 and 80 percent read after purchase. Arthur Young & Co, Warranties Rules
Consumer Baseline Study: Final Report 58 (Federal Trade Commission 1979) (28.4 percent
of all survey respondents read warranty prepurchase). These numbers provide evidence of
readership rates, at least in the paper warranty context, orders of magnitudes higher than
ordinary consumer contract fine print. Another datum comes from Robert A. Hillman,
Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal
Implications, in Jane K. Winn, ed, Consumer Protection in the Age of the “Information
Economy” 283, 290–92 (Ashgate 2006) (reporting survey findings that of the minority of
law student respondents who responded that they might read terms beyond price and description, nearly all did so to look at warranty descriptions). Generally speaking, consumers are more likely to read warranties ex post than ex ante. See Shmuel I. Becher and Tal
Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User
Participation, 14 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 303, 316 (2008) (arguing that scholars
should more readily distinguish ex post and ex ante readership).
57 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, 43 J Legal Stud at 19–22 (cited in note
2); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts”, 78 U Chi L
Rev 165, 179–81 (2011).
58 See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am U L Rev 131, 146–47 (1970) (characterizing adhesion contracts as just one part of “a unitary, purchased bundle”).
59 See, for example, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of
Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J Empirical Legal
Stud 447, 451 (2008) (concluding that “there is no evidence” that “greater market power is
associated with more pro-seller standard terms”). Field experiment data is generally in accord. See, for example, Enrique Seira, Alan Elizondo, and Eduardo Laguna-Müggenburg, Are
Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 9 Am Econ J: Econ
Pol 277, 291–98 (2017) (finding very small or negative effects of personalized disclosures on
credit card account holders’ behavior in a large randomized control trial); Bruno Ferman,
Reading the Fine Print: Information Disclosure in the Brazilian Credit Card Market, 62 Management Science 3534, 3545 (2016) (reporting that, in a randomized field experiment, more
salient disclosure of credit card interest rates did not affect consumer behavior except in
high-risk clients); Sumit Agarwal, et al, Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence
from Credit Cards, 130 Q J Econ 111, 147–52 (2015) (finding that the effect of a “months-topayoff” disclosure could not be precisely estimated).
60 Wilkinson-Ryan, 103 Cornell L Rev at 165 (cited in note 7).
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of agreement.”61 Once reminded, users may “reconsider their
communications.”62
That is, we all know that some terms apply, and we may be
behaviorally influenced by what we each imagine to be the rules
of the road.63 To be concrete, when we agree to a user agreement
before commenting online, perhaps we correctly intuit that the
agreement tells us not to be a jerk and behave better as a result.
However, even the most cutting-edge research has only begun to
ask about individuals’ naïve views of consumer contract terms.64
It seems unlikely that firms know more.

61 Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 Utah L Rev
993, 1015.
62 Id. But see David A. Hoffman and Zev J. Eigen, Contract Consideration and
Behavior, 85 Geo Wash L Rev 351, 385–88 (2017) (noting the lack of evidence of changed
user behavior resulting from user consent to ostensibly legally binding agreements and
arguing for new forms of formation formality); Monika Leszczyńska, Think Twice before
You Sign! An Experiment on a Cautionary Function of Contract Formalities *12 (unpublished manuscript, Sept 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8CBF-MD94 (reporting
survey findings that individuals acted more impulsively when clicking a box than when
signing their name during interactions with websites’ forms).
63 Wilkinson-Ryan provides some evidence in support of this hypothesis. WilkinsonRyan, 103 Cornell L Rev at 164–65 (cited in note 7). See also Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L
Rev at 600–01 (cited in note 1) (discussing divergent consumer views as to what privacy
policies say); Eigen, 168 J Inst & Theoretical Econ at 135–37 (cited in note 7) (showing that,
as individuals spent more time reading the contract ex ante, they were more likely to perform
in accordance with its terms ex post). This sort of intuition gives rise to the famously unsuccessful Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211, otherwise known as the reasonable expectations doctrine. As the Restatement puts it, “Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 211(f) (1979).
64 There are a number of papers that discuss the terms that consumers expect, but
which do not focus on performance obligations. For example, consumers do not seem to
accurately recall the presence of certain clauses in some consumer contracts. See, for example, Jeff Sovern, et al, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An
Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 Md L Rev
1, 41 (2015) (reporting survey results in which few consumers recalled seeing an arbitration agreement in a contract that contained one); Debra Pogrund Stark, Jessica M.
Choplin, and Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and Practices That
Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 Ind L Rev 797, 813–20 (2013) (reporting survey
findings showing that real estate consumers exhibited a poor understanding of waivers of
remedies); Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship among Citizenship,
Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 Conn L Rev 381, 414–16 (2008) (reporting
survey results in which only 17 percent of an employee sample recalled that an employment agreement they signed contained an arbitration clause). There is a more robust literature about naïve views of legal rules outside of contract. For example, see Gregory N.
Mandel, Anne A. Fast, and Kristina R. Olson, Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism
Fallacy, 2015 BYU L Rev 915, 946–47 (reporting experimental results on individuals’ incorrect views about the content of intellectual property law).
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In fact, if consumer contracts are really just adding an extra
feeling of heft behind implicit performance terms, why should
firms insert any explicit behavioral terms at all, especially because term drafting is costly and may result in blowback?65 Some
might respond that firms hope to influence the collective understanding of what terms are normal by pushing out particular language—that is, to create collective reasonable expectations one
term at a time.66 The idea isn’t actually so outlandish over a long
enough time.67 But it is hard to imagine that any firms follow this
kind of generational strategy.68
Thus, the best extant empirical evidence about how ordinary
precatory fine print functions concludes that it doesn’t, at least
with respect to ex ante behavioral regulation and deterrence.
B.

The Standard Account: The Option Value of Fine Print

Given that terms are unread, why do firms waste the time
drafting them? Most argue, in one form or another, that even if
terms don’t affect behavior ex ante, they certainly can ex post.
That claim is common with respect to terms that limit consumer
rights: explicit terms make legal defenses stronger.69 However,
the defense doesn’t require all terms to be litigated, and it
65 For general discussion of a type of blowback, see Ethan J. Leib and Zev J. Eigen,
Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: The Unread and the
Undead, 2017 U Ill L Rev 65, 101–02.
66 See id at 79 (“The more we fail to resist zombie [boilerplate] contracts, the easier
it is for drafting entities to assert that they hold a reasonable belief that individuals manifesting assent to terms would still do so, even in the face of more and more rightsencroaching terms.”).
67 It is hard to find data that supports or refutes the idea that individuals’ subjective
expectations of contract terms have changed. And yet, in the 1980s, for example, forum
selection clauses were seen as controversial and seemingly limited to negotiated deals.
However, over time (helped by the Supreme Court) they have become anodyne. See
Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute, 499 US 585, 593–94 (1991) (broadening the enforceability
of standardized forum selection clauses in large part because they save litigation costs).
68 For one, it might not work! There is evidence from the privacy context that subjective views about Fourth Amendment privacy may be relatively fixed. See Matthew B.
Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U Chi
L Rev 1747, 1794–95 (2017) (finding that, while Supreme Court decisions had short-term
effects on the public’s views on lawful surveillance, these effects disappeared over time).
After reading a copy of this Article, Professor Danielle Citron, however, suggested to me
that Facebook’s real name policy might be an example of a firm with just such a long-term
commitment in mind, based on Mark Zuckerberg’s personal commitments.
69 Eigen, An Experimental Test at *5 (cited in note 15) (describing the common notion
that, without media use contracts, “companies would be left with greater costs of policing
implied contractual rights in court, instead of being able to rely on the explicit wording of
the ‘fine print’”).
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acknowledges that in fact firms rarely insist on the actual language in their consumer contracts. Rather, the terms are used opportunistically, policing consumers on the margin.70 The fine print
functions as an option.
This view is most closely associated with a short essay by
Professor Lucian Bebchuk and former Judge Richard Posner.71
Bebchuk and Posner claim that aversive terms in consumer contracts are intended to give firms the flexibility to police “egregious” conduct that is not easily reducible to semantic contract
terms.72 By giving firms “discretion” in dealing with consumers,
terms that look one-sided turn out in practice to harm few consumers.73 The firm can choose to exercise its rights when it is in
its interest to do so. These options—even if implicit—have value
for their holders.74
This option-centered account sheds light on some puzzling
features of current practice outside of the conventional context of
defenses to obligation. Precatory terms are sometimes “exercised,” though not in court.75 Reference to them makes it easier
for sites to ban abusive commentators without recourse to legal
process, and they serve as a defense in actions by commentators
and the third parties they might have harmed.76 Generally, firms

70 Bebchuk and Posner, 104 Mich L Rev at 833–34 (cited in note 23) (describing how
firms use their contractual terms to enforce policies against consumers who do not act in
good faith). See also Johnston, 104 Mich L Rev at 877 (cited in note 5) (“The strategy of
allowing employees the discretion to grant case-specific benefits beyond those that are
required by the standard-form contract can be seen to be a sophisticated way for the firm
to grow its revenues.”).
71 See generally Bebchuk and Posner, 104 Mich L Rev 827 (cited in note 23).
72 Id at 831.
73 Id.
74 See, for example, George S. Geis, Book Review, Economics as Context for Contract
Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 569, 585–86 (2008) (explaining the importance of option theory to
contract law); Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case
against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 Colum L Rev 1428, 1460 (2004) (describing
the option to behave opportunistically as a valuable part of contracting).
75 See Ammori, 127 Harv L Rev at 2274–78 (cited in note 32) (describing the implementation of speech codes contained in TOS at various digital companies through “private
jurisprudence”).
76 But see Kim, 2009 Utah L Rev at 1028–29 n 144 (cited in note 61) (noting that a
firm was investigated for consumer fraud for failing to enforce its own terms and conditions against abuse and subsequently changed its terms). The fact that most actions
against firms that ban content that is barred by their TOS fail on § 230 grounds makes
the marginal legal utility of TOS particularly puzzling. See 47 USC § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable.”).
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will prefer to point out explicit reasons for self-help to consumers
so as to avoid reputational blowback.77 This works because consumers generally think contracts are legitimate—even adhesive
contracts on the web.78 Thus, precatory consumer contract terms
permit firms to cheaply weed out particular bad consumers from
communities that would otherwise be contaminated by their
presence.79
Options can also be exercised to police competitors. ProCD v
Zeidenberg,80 an early internet law case, fits that fact pattern. In
ProCD, the court enforced a noncommercial use limitation on use
of a database (which was otherwise not subject to copyright).
Judge Frank Easterbrook explicitly framed the problem as one of
permitting price discrimination by preserving the firm’s option to
police competitors who came dressed as consumers, writing that
“Zeidenberg wants to use the data without paying the seller’s
price.”81 Or contracts might be used as evidence in suits that firms
tried (but failed) to prevent bad conduct, like harassing speech or
copyright infringement.82 The terms, in short, are a defensive
shield behind which the firm has room to maneuver.83

77 See Ponte, 7 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev at 78–79 (cited in note 37) (“Often, nondisparagement provisions are framed in a manner that keeps the primary focus on the business investment in the brand’s development and establishment of its goodwill in the marketplace, while obscuring the effort to limit consumer speech.”). See also Becher and
Zarsky, 14 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev at 322–28 (cited in note 56) (discussing ways that
consumers learn of terms ex post).
78 See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms:
Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J Legal Analysis 1, 41–42 (2017) (noting that,
when contracts include “unenforceable and misleading terms,” consumers who are unfamiliar with the law may rationally believe that terms are enforceable and binding when they
are not); Wilkinson-Ryan, 103 Cornell L Rev at 121 (cited in note 7) (arguing that firms use
boilerplate because it may chill complaints); Dennis P. Stolle and Andrew J. Slain, Standard
Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of
Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 Behav Sci & L 83, 91–92 (1997)
(reporting survey findings that “the presence of [boilerplate] exculpatory language did have
a deterrent effect on participants’ propensity to seek compensation”).
79 See, for example, Citron and Norton, 91 BU L Rev at 1468–69 (cited in note 24)
(describing how online platforms use their terms of use to justify removing hate speech).
80 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
81 Id at 1454.
82 See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 169–72 (cited in note 41).
83 As Ed Ferguson, Vice President and Associate General Counsel at IAC, and
Michael Cheah, General Counsel at Vimeo, explained to me, the TOS provide protection
for the firm—the freedom of action to exclude users or manage disputes. Telephone
Interview with Ed Ferguson and Michael Cheah (Apr 28, 2017) (“Interview with Ed
Ferguson and Michael Cheah”) (on file with author).
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Although it has significant explanatory force, the option
theory doesn’t explain some puzzling aspects of the consumer contracting universe.84 For one, enforcing buried terms may result in
perverse effects. I have already mentioned reputational harms,
but consider also the possibility that an entire industry may become tainted by using contracts in opportunistic ways. Consumers will then actively work to either avoid dealing with firms or
behave unscrupulously in turn. This description marks the current state of both the cable TV and the cellphone sectors.85
Even if firms can avoid reputational sanctions, the option explanation simply ignores the possibility that firms might really
84 See Feldman & Teichman, 100 Georgetown L J at 31, 49 (cited in note 55) (discounting the option explanation after experimental study about individual motivations).
Professor Guy Rub, in a survey of 279 reported decisions analyzing the copyright/contract
nexus, found no examples of a consumer sued for breach of an intellectual property standard form contract. Rub, 103 Va L Rev at 1198 (cited in note 13).
85 For example, consumers often try to switch cellphone carriers notwithstanding
cancellation fees. The result is large consumer debts. See In re Cellphone Termination Fee
Cases, 193 Cal App 4th 298, 306 (2011) (explaining that Sprint assessed $299,473,408 in
early termination fees during the class period, but only $73,775,975 was paid by consumers). See also Consumer Credit Reports: A Study of Medical and Non-Medical Collections
*19 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Dec 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U4FT
-K2EQ (showing that telecom debts, at 8.7 percent, represent the second largest form of
debt referred to collection agencies that shows up on consumer credit reports, after medical care). But firms rarely are made whole through debt collection, and typically they are
thus left without real recourse for breach. See id at *34 (presenting data indicating that
the average payment rate for debts referred to collection across six industries is only 6.7
percent). The move to “no-contract clauses” is in this sense possibly a reaction to the failure
of termination clauses in fixed-duration agreements. There is an interesting dynamic here,
whereby no-contract clauses may be in part an attempt by the firm to make salient the
alternative (termination fees) and thus affect the behavior of the small percentage of consumers who stick with a contract deal. That is, by advertising “no contract,” the firm
makes the remaining part of its consumer base realize that they are buying shackles and
become constrained accordingly. Evidence for this proposition is suggestive: the churn rate
during the period from 2013—the year when T-Mobile was the first major carrier to introduce a no-contract plan—to 2017 shows a significant drop, from 3.3 percent to 2.29 percent. Average Monthly Churn Rate for Wireless Carriers in the United States from 1st
Quarter 2013 to 4th Quarter 2017 (Statista, 2018), online at http://www.statista.com/
statistics/283511/average-monthly-churn-rate-top-wireless-carriers-us/ (visited Mar 31,
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). Additionally, as no-contract plans became more common, the media was particularly quick to argue that two-year agreements were akin to
being in jail. See, for example, Alison Griswold, So Long, Cellphone Contracts. You Won’t
Be Missed. (Slate, Aug 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/DFJ5-7UXE (arguing that,
while most consumers will be happy to see the end of two-year contracts, some who do not
mind the commitment and do not worry about having the newest phones will be better off
staying on two-year plans); Joanna Stern, Kill the Wireless Contract! Buy Your Own Phone
(Wall St J, Feb 25, 2015), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/kill-the-wireless-contract
-buy-your-own-phone-1424807865 (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable)
(“Without much thought, I did what most Americans do every two years: I agreed to be
locked in by a multibillion-dollar wireless company.”).
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want to govern ex ante consumer behavior—that is, to use contract to shape consumers’ activity in the absence of injury. One
can’t really blame theorists for their lack of curiosity: they are
observing a world of buried and hidden terms. But why has the
market produced that outcome when firms appear to have significant incentives and capabilities to maximize the readership of at
least some of their contracts?86
Perhaps we can attribute the lack of innovation in consumer
contracts to a market failure created by a particular, villainous
guild.
C.

Legal Market Failure

Whether because of social pressures that reward conformity,87 the bar’s monopoly,88 a desire to please the client,89 the fear
of legal liability, or network effects,90 lawyers generally are cast
as reluctant contract innovators. Terms and conditions, as “convenient and known instruments” in the legal toolset, come easily
to hand for lawyers who are tasked by their clients with solving

86 See, for example, Hoffman, 91 NYU L Rev at 1639 n 189 (cited in note 7) (discussing firm innovation around dynamic webpages that utilize data about prospective customers with the goal of encouraging them to shop); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious
about User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for Software, 12 Geo Mason L Rev 687, 695–
96 (2004) (describing the benefits to firms of creating contracts that consumers can understand ex ante, which include building goodwill and ensuring that consumers do not exceed
the scope of their rights).
87 See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 Emory L J 1401, 1409 (2009) (noting that lawyers reuse language to “save
themselves drafting costs, economize on learning costs, reuse ‘safe’ language that has been
vetted by courts, and signal to prospective counterparties that the contract drafter does
not seek an unfair advantage”).
88 See Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 228–37 (cited in note 8) (“[A] system based
on this level of uniformity in thinking is an almost impossible environment for transformative change.”).
89 See Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias, Moral Hazard, and
Situational Pressure, 9 Ohio St Entrepreneurial Bus L J 379, 417 (2015) (explaining that
the desire to please the client induces an attorney “to revise the contract in a manner that
minimizes the possibility of the revisions disrupting the transaction”).
90 See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va L Rev 713, 725–27 (1997)
(describing “network benefits” as a “set of advantages . . . available to a firm that adopts
a contract term that is or will become contemporaneously used by many firms for a significant period of time”).
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consumers’ behavioral problems.91 More exotic forms of regulation, like visceral notice,92 are both unproven and could potentially backfire.93 The result is an allegedly inefficient equilibrium.
Zev Eigen makes this argument most bluntly:
Lawyers at a firm do not like to be sued for malpractice any
less than in-house counsel enjoy being fired. So generally
speaking, it is a wise and rational self-preserving strategy to
avoid reinventing the wheel or doing something differently
from every other lawyer working for other similarly situated
companies or firms. If every lawyer before you relied on terms
and conditions to solve a problem, you should too. How could
a client fault you for using the same tactics as every other
lawyer?94
Eigen is far from the only commentator to suggest that lawyers have failed to offer creative and value-maximizing solutions
to clients in the new economy.95 As Professor Gillian Hadfield has
recently argued, many entrepreneurial businesses have come to
conclude that large law firms cannot solve their business problems “at any price.”96 She points to the complaints of the general
counsel of CBS, who finds that lawyers create terms and conditions that either “lock [content] down” or entirely give it away.97
CBS—and other companies navigating today’s economy—sought

91

Eigen, An Experimental Test at *4 (cited in note 15).
See Calo, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1030 (cited in note 24) (“Visceral notice . . . does
not necessarily rely on describing practices in language or symbols. Rather, it leverages a
consumer’s very experience of a product or service to warn or inform.”).
93 Though lawyers are traditionally seen as risk averse with respect to new technologies, they are often also criticized for taking risks by drafting to the edge of what’s enforceable. Sometimes, we can’t win. See Study of Uniform Commercial Code Memoranda
Presented to the Commission and Stenographic Report of Public Hearing on Article 2 of the
Code, NY State Law Revision Commission, Legislative Doc No 65 at 177 (1954) (statement
of Professor Karl Llewellyn) (“Any engineer makes his construction within a margin of
safety, and a wide margin of safety, so that he knows for sure that he is getting what he
is gunning for. The practice of business lawyers has been, however . . . to draft . . . to the
edge of the possible.”).
94 Eigen, An Experimental Test at *4 (cited in note 15).
95 See, for example, Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist
Transaction Cost Engineer, 69 Fordham L Rev 31, 52 (2000) (describing how drafting hidden contractual terms impacts lawyers’ reputations even when they are actually advancing clients’ interests); Scott Edward Walker, Top 10 Reasons Why Entrepreneurs Hate
Lawyers (Venture Hacks, Jan 14, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/256G-BU2M (including “overlawyering” by using a “one-size-fits-all approach to deals” in a list of reasons why
entrepreneurs hate lawyers).
96 Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 188 (cited in note 8).
97 Id.
92
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a Goldilocks solution. But it was “very hard to locate the lawyers
who know how to think like that.”98
The former general counsel of Tumblr, Ari Shahdadi, describing Tumblr’s terms of service (TOS) revision process (about which
I say more in Part III.A), noted that “law firm feedback was beyond useless, as their assessment of risks is way off and they can’t
really balance the interests of users” and that “[n]o law firms are
good at this.”99 When asked what institutional barriers exist to
widespread use of precatory consumer contracts, he squarely laid
the blame at the feet of the bar:
[D]ecaying and venal legal institutions [ ] surround US companies and don’t highlight the benefits (and low risks) of
user-friendly contracts—a federal judiciary that routinely
kowtows to concentrated financial power (ergo allowing class
action waivers and mandatory arb[itration] clauses), a corrupt and self-interested bar that invests in inefficiency and
hooks for meritless plaintiffs’ suits, that same bar being insanely overly conservative on the defense/advice side to protect their inefficient and exorbitant fee structures, etc.100
Similarly, Michal Rosenn, the former general counsel of
Kickstarter, suggested that outside law firms have a “very lawyerly risk averse approach” and that, as a consequence, they are
likely to avoid changes to consumer-facing terms. This is true
both in traditional “Biglaw” and in firms that serve entrepreneurs: general counsel, by virtue of being embedded in the business, develop a healthier appetite for risk-taking and a sense of
the relative unimportance of small-bore legal problems.101
Etsy’s representatives, when prompted to reflect on barriers
to change, also mentioned risk aversion as a driver, though not
standing alone:
It’s hard to know for sure why other companies haven’t [innovated], but there are certainly costs associated with
making significant changes to user policies. Some of those

98

Id at 190.
Email from Ari Shahdadi to David A. Hoffman (Mar 22, 2017, 3:08 pm EDT)
(“Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm”) (on file with author).
100 Email from Ari Shahdadi to David A. Hoffman (Mar 22, 2017, 5:45 pm EDT)
(“Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm”) (on file with author).
101 Telephone Interview with Michal Rosenn (Mar 24, 2017) (“Interview with Michal
Rosenn”) (on file with author).
99
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costs—in-house counsel’s time, translation, and outside counsel review—are relatively concrete and easy to quantify. Others, such as the risks of attracting unwanted attention from
users or plaintiff’s counsel or omitting some crucial piece of
legal language, are harder to evaluate. But we suspect that
some combination of cost sensitivity and risk aversion is responsible for many companies[’] continued use of more oldfashioned policies.102
As a lawyer who worked at Etsy on its terms of use project
lamented, outside counsel “will never give you what you want[.]
[Y]ou have to hold the pen . . . [because] [t]hey focus on magic
words.”103
It is possible that American lawyers—and the law schools
that produce them—are to blame for the failure of consumer contracts to offer anything beyond option values for firms. It might
be that in a world in which lawyers were forced to directly compete against other sorts of professional services, consumer contracts would be better tailored to firms’ needs (though the
examples we see from less regulated jurisdictions don’t compel
that point).104 But there are also reasons to be skeptical about an
account that posits that lawyers are entirely to blame.
First, though it is true that the worst thing you can say about
a legal argument is that it is creative, it’s nonsense to deny the
existence of legal innovations, even in the context of consumer
contract fine print. For example, in the mid-1990s, Alan
Kaplinsky, a Philadelphia-based big-firm lawyer, invented the
class action waiver in a consumer contract.105 That innovation
created enormous value for his clients.106 Other lawyers built on
102 Email from Bonnie Broeren, Head of Policy, Etsy, to David A. Hoffman (Mar 28,
2017, 2:17 pm EDT) (“Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:17 pm”) (on file with author), quoting
Matthew Glick, Senior Product and Commercial Counsel, Etsy.
103 Telephone Interview with Hissan Bajwa, former senior counsel, Etsy (Apr 4, 2017)
(“Interview with Hissan Bajwa”) (on file with author).
104 Notably, though lawyers abroad face fewer barriers to competition, they have not
produced (to my knowledge) distinctively communicative legal terms. That’s true,
although “new types of business models for legal work” are flourishing, including “joint
venture[s] between lawyers, software engineers, and business experts.” Hadfield, Rules
for a Flat World at 241–45 (cited in note 8) (offering a description of the UK’s deregulatory
system).
105 Chris Mondics, A Pioneer in the Class Action Lawsuit Tug-of-War (Philly.com, Nov
11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K6KC-2GWG.
106 For a general discussion of the value of contractual innovation, see Kevin E. Davis,
Contracts as Technology, 88 NYU L Rev 83, 88–97 (2013) (discussing how innovation in
contracts can beneficially change parties’ behavior).
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Kaplinsky’s invention, eventually (through a deliberate strategy
of creation and refinement) creating a clause for AT&T that applied waivers to arbitration in a way that survived Supreme
Court review.107
Second, many firms have apparently succeeded in communicating with their users using governance documents. They’ve
done so by moving from “contract” to “policy.” As Professor Eric
Goldman argued in 2008:
[B]ehavioral restrictions that do not need to be specifically
barred in the user agreement can be moved into a separate
statement of community norms/standards. This way, users
are told what they can do and not do, but the statement does
not have the force of law. Ideally, other users can be given
tools to help them enforce the community norms. Even better, the norms can be posted on a wiki so that the site’s users
can help update them as the site’s community evolves.
...
[A] separate non-legal document may be a more effective tool
to communicate site expectations than embedding those
rules in a user agreement that no one will read.108
Such guidelines are now commonly used to regulate user conduct in contexts in which firms find such regulation to be important.109 The relationship between nonbinding guidelines and
107 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L Rev 605, 654–56 (2010) (explaining how AT&T has changed its
class arbitration waiver clause over time, seeking to create a version that is upheld by
courts). See also AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333, 340, 352 (2011) (holding
that the California Supreme Court’s rule, which had resulted in AT&T’s arbitration waiver
being found “unconscionable,” was preempted by federal law).
108 Eric Goldman, Lori Drew Conviction Reflections, Part 3 of 3: Lessons for CyberLawyers Drafting User Agreements (Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Dec 16, 2008),
archived at http://perma.cc/4DDE-5T44.
109 An example is a firm that Professor Goldman once worked with—Nextdoor. The
site’s “community guidelines” effectively contain a series of norms that don’t read as simple rehashed terms of use. Community Guidelines (Nextdoor, Dec 7, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/AV66-E36H. Another example is the intellectual property guidelines at
Vimeo, which were developed by the community team at that firm—with oversight from
legal—to create a communicatively rich way to explain to users the intellectual property
rules that the site wanted to enforce. Help Center/Vimeo Guidelines (Vimeo, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/NP4B-PDPD. As the firm’s general counsel pointed out to me,
the firm in those guidelines uses phrases and a tone (“Don’t be a creep”) that it would
never use in its terms of use. Interview with Ed Ferguson and Michael Cheah (cited in
note 83).
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terms of use is an interesting one. It seems that as firms grow
larger and more complex, it becomes ever more difficult to maintain the separation: the policies increasingly refer back to their
enabling contracts, reducing the acoustic separation that gave the
former their communicative push. The result is that, at least for
some firms, using consumer contracts to shape behavior would
seem to be a useful innovation.
The next Part identifies a few firms that seem to have experimented in this vein.
III. COMMUNICATING THROUGH CONTRACTS
So far, I have described fine print that was traditional in both
form and placement. That is, it wasn’t frontloaded in the contract
but rather placed somewhere in its guts, and it looked and
sounded like it was written by and for lawyers. I’ve suggested that
conventional explanations for this phenomenon rest on either believing that there’s simply insufficient demand for communicative
terms to make them worthwhile to produce or that, while demand
exists, the market fails to match it because of the bar’s monopoly.
In this Part, I provide some examples that together suggest
these prevailing accounts are, if not wrong, then at least incomplete. Sometimes, firms create fine print that at least sounds like
it was written by a human. Whether these counterexamples provide the exception to the rule, or its undoing, is a subject I take
on later in the Article.
Consider Bumble, a dating app, which functions somewhat
like the better-known Tinder, except that women must initiate
conversations. Indeed, the app was founded by Whitney Wolfe,
who had previously helped to start Tinder.110 Bumble’s terms and
conditions, like those of many other modern firms, control intellectual property rights and regulate user behavior. But Bumble’s
approach sounds different. It begins with a jaunty paragraph:
Hey guys! Welcome to Bumble’s Terms and Conditions of Use
(these “Terms”). Our lawyers insist that we impose rules on
users to protect all of our hard work. This is a contract between you and Bumble Trading Inc and we want you to know
yours and our rights before you use the Bumble application

110 Leora Yashari, Meet the Tinder Co-Founder Trying to Change Online Dating
Forever (Vanity Fair, Aug 7, 2015), online at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2015/08/
bumble-app-whitney-wolfe (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
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(“App”). Please take a few moments to read these Terms before enjoying the App, because once you access, view or use
the App, you are going to be legally bound by these Terms (so
probably best to read them first!).111
And the rest of the terms, though substantively identical to
those of a thousand other sites, are interspersed with exclamation
points and snark. Some of the wording explicitly attempts to remind users of offline norms of courtesy and reciprocity:
Also, we don’t appreciate users doing bad things to Bumble—
we’ve worked hard on our creation, so scraping or replicating
any part of the App without our prior consent is expressly
prohibited.112
The eleventh section of the terms, headed “Miscellaneous,” is
introduced as follows: “Firstly, those standard clauses at the end
of most contracts (boring, we know).”113 After users have agreed
that the terms may be unilaterally modified, the terms then flag
that “[s]ome more legal mumbo jumbo” is on its way, including a
waiver of class action relief and choice of forum clauses, all presented in their original legal language.114
Later, I return to Bumble’s story; for now, consider how different such terms sound from the ordinary drone of end-user
license agreements (EULAs) that you haven’t read. (To remind
yourself what that drone sounds like, take a look at iTunes’s
EULA, as it’s likely at hand.) To the extent that you found
Bumble’s terms refreshing, consider the incentive structures that
produced them. Doesn’t everyone now agree that no one reads
consumer contracts and they are, at best, a series of weak option
clauses? If that’s true, what could drive Bumble (and other
firms)115 to create terms that are moderately funny and easier to
parse?116

111 Terms and Conditions of Use (Bumble, Sept 6, 2017) (“Bumble Terms and
Conditions”), archived at http://perma.cc/R9GT-N2MS.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See, for example, Terms of Use (Netflix, Aug 1, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/4VRU-FV7E (beginning its terms of use with the possibly disarming, or at
least chipper, exhortation: “Welcome to Netflix!”); Jet Terms of Use (Jet, Sept 12, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/CK9J-RXZH (“We apologize for the all-caps shouting we’re
about to do, but these parts are important. (*takes deep breath*)”).
116 To be precise, they are law school funny.
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To answer that question, I talked with numerous participants in the consumer contracts industry and was led to focus on
a few platform economy firms that have written terms that appear to actually seek to communicate with, and influence, their
users.117 Through a series of semistructured interviews, I asked
general counsel at Tumblr, Kickstarter, and Etsy, as well as
AirBnb and Bumble, how they came to write the terms they did
and what they sought to gain.118 All are businesses that rely on
participation by users, and all have cultivated relationships with
their “community” that revolve, to one degree or another, around
trust.119 So let us examine the mass contracts they created.
A.

Tumblr: Because They Cared

Consider first the case of Tumblr. Ari Shahdadi, describing
his work as the general counsel at Tumblr, listed this revision of
the TOS as one of his great successes.120 When he arrived on the
job in May 2011, he thought the TOS “need[ed] to get re-written.
. . . It was not in keeping with [ ] the trust relationship that David
117 There are, of course, other firms with excellent, communicative terms. The
examples here are not intended to be exclusive, but rather the result of the limits of my
contacts. For discussion of Pinterest, see Elizabeth Townsend Gard and Bri Whetstone,
Copyright and Social Media: A Preliminary Case Study of Pinterest, 31 Miss C L Rev 249,
270–75 (2012) (describing Pinterest’s evolution of its terms and summarizing that
“[e]ssentially the Terms of Service are the same [as a previous iteration], with one notable
difference: the new Terms can actually be understood by the average user”). An old (but
still well-known) example is Borland’s “No-Nonsense License Statement,” which urged
users to treat the software “just like a book.” Thom Holwerda, Borland in the 1980s: “Treat
Software Just Like a Book” (OSNews, Oct 15, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/CRH3
-LQ6P. See also Terms of Service (500px), archived at http://perma.cc/WWW8-GYHA (presenting terms of use in two columns: the legal language on the left and a section headed
“Basically” on the right containing a paraphrased version).
118 A semistructured interview follows a “general outline of the topics to be covered
during the interview but is free to follow the flow of the interview in deciding when and
how to pursue each thread.” Robert M. Lawless, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, and Thomas S.
Ulen, Empirical Methods in Law 73 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed 2016). They can be particularly
helpful in interviewing attorneys. I interviewed Etsy’s policy team and Tumblr’s former
general counsel by email and conducted all other conversations by phone. I sent a preliminary draft of this Article to the sources and offered them an opportunity to correct any
direct quotes and suggest changes to my interpretation. (I incorporated all edits to direct
quotes from interviews and some of the suggested changes to interpretation.) Each interview or email exchange focused on four basic topics: Why did the firm come to create the
terms it did, what was the process of their drafting, what barriers did they face, and how
did they measure or evaluate success?
119 Sharing economy firms are typically built on trust between strangers. See, for example, Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1634 (cited in note 8).
120 Ari Shahdadi, I Fought the Law and the Law Won (Lawyerin’, Sept 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CUJ6-ZMPX.
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[Karp, Tumblr’s founder,] had built with the user base. So that
was [ ] on my list [ ] day one.”121 Here are what Tumblr’s terms (in
part) looked like before the edit:
FIGURE 1: TUMBLR TOS (2010)122

Shahdadi and his team saw the consumers of Tumblr’s EULA
as “entrepreneurs, inventors, [and] creators.”123 The mission of the
general counsel’s office was to find “the right thing to do” and then
“advocate for that, but we also give our users a way for them to
express how they feel if they . . . want to.”124 Indeed, both
Shahdadi and Karp report that changing the terms to make them
user-friendly was a “basic moral imperative,” in part because the
site was “very focused on creators.”125 They generated terms
through an iterative process:
[W]e expected [the users] to read the TOS (and interrogate
us on any changes that were suspect). Part of that process
was previewing TOS and policy changes and asking for feedback before launching them—which I personally responded
to (and it was good feedback). In general we had established

121 Jenna Matecki, Episode 029: Ari Shahdadi on Measuring Success through Impact
33:56–34:09 (Notes on Doing Podcast, Apr 18, 2016), online at http://notesondoing.com/
029-ari-shahdadi/ (visited Feb 25, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
122 Terms of Service (Tumblr, Mar 3, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/MK7P-XHUD.
123 Randy Milch, GC at Tumblr: Legal Issues Faced by the Digital Publishing Platform
29:02–29:33 (In-House Legal Podcast, Aug 19, 2015), online at http://legaltalknet
work.com/podcasts/in-house-legal/2015/08/gc-tumblr-legal-issues-faced-digital-publishing
platform/ (visited Mar 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
124 Id.
125 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100).
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a relationship of trust between company and user in a number of ways and the TOS & policies were the written instantiation of that trust. I’d liken it to basic institution-building,
something companies are usually awful at. This is why I
didn’t, e.g., include one of those stupid class-action waivers
or a mandatory arb[itration] clause even though they were
considered “legal innovations” by the second update I did to
the documents.
It’s the difference between “corporate social responsibility” as
BS marketing and actually caring about your users/
customers.126
Tumblr’s process was curated at the highest levels of the
firm. Shahdadi drafted the terms (with the help of law professor
Eric Goldman), and Karp annotated them.127
Tumblr’s revised TOS are notable for their translations of
legal terms. For example, the service, as is typical, mandates: “No
individual under the age of thirteen (13) may use the Services,
provide any personal information to Tumblr, or otherwise submit
personal information through the Services.”128 Under that prohibition, in a shaded box, Tumblr helpfully glosses:
FIGURE 2: TUMBLR TOS: AGE PROHIBITION (2016)129

Similarly, Tumblr provides a precisely worded obligation with
multiple different examples of how users can behave maliciously
with respect to the service, coupled with a shaded explanation:

126 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99). See also Ammori, 127 Harv
L Rev at 2273 (cited in note 32) (describing Shahdadi’s willingness to send an email to
every user who commented on the proposed changes to the TOS).
127 See Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99) (“[W]e went in fully knowing the risk that a court would integrate [the annotations] with the document.”).
128 Terms of Service (Sept 8, 2016) (“Tumblr TOS, 2016”), archived at http://perma.cc/
D666-4U8G.
129 Id.
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FIGURE 3: TUMBLR TOS: MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR (2016)130

Like the platform precatory terms I described earlier, Tumblr
insists that “[y]ou agree to provide Tumblr with accurate, complete, and updated registration information, particularly your
email address.”131 But unlike them, Tumblr then justifies the injunction in another shaded paragraph:
FIGURE 4: TUMBLR TOS: EMAIL WARNING (2016)132

After the new terms rolled out, Shahdadi celebrated the response to them:
[I don’t have quantitative] data but I know they were read—
people were turning them into memes when we launched
them. We had a bunch of “fake news” misinterpretations of
the terms as well, but our own users fought those off because

130
131
132

Id.
Id.
Tumblr TOS, 2016 (cited in note 128).
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they knew we had their backs. We also forced a click-through
in a pop-up or lightbox when we did the update to make sure
people at least knew the terms were being updated.133
Shahdadi claims that the site made the updated terms conspicuous “to genuinely make sure people saw them—but it also
ended up being great marketing.”134 He believes that user-friendly
terms on the margins produce few real legal risks. (“I took the
indemnification provision out—who the heck ever seeks indemnity from a user? It would tank the business.”)135 At the same
time, “it built real trust in the company and company management.”136 But these cost-benefit calculations were, in Shahdadi’s
view, secondary to the firm’s motivation, which was intrinsic: “because we care(d).”137
Shahdadi also suggests that the business case for friendly
and precatory contracts is not obvious for all firms. Though being
user-friendly “is still surely a net positive,” the advantages to being able to exploit consumers’ data through contract terms are
also undeniable: they make the “marginal consideration [of userfriendliness] worthless as it is incredibly hard to build and maintain . . . one of these [social media] platform businesses at this
point [outside of Google/Apple/Facebook’s orbit].”138
B.

Kickstarter: Reflecting Its Values

Kickstarter is a well-known crowdfunding platform that allows backers to support creators’ projects by pledging money to
their campaigns in exchange for rewards.139 Kickstarter reincorporated as a public benefit corporation under Delaware law in
2016.140 Its terms were last revised in 2014, as a part of a project
to make the entire site more transparent and easy to access.141

133

Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99).
Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100).
139 See Our Mission Is to Help Bring Creative Projects to Life (Kickstarter, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/R7CR-RTKE.
140 Yancey Strickler, Perry Chen, and Charles Adler, Kickstarter Is Now a Benefit
Corporation (Kickstarter Blog, Sept 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/54NC-2TM4
(announcing Kickstarter’s incorporation as a public benefit corporation and explaining
that “Benefit Corporations are for-profit companies that are obligated to consider the impact of their decisions on society, not only shareholders”).
141 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101).
134
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Indeed, Kickstarter’s public benefit corporation charter now explicitly requires the firm to operate in a way that “reflect[s] its
values” and, further, mandates that its “terms of use and privacy
policies will be clear, fair, and transparent. Kickstarter will not
cover every possible future contingency, or claim rights and powers just because it can or because doing so is industry standard.”142
As a part of the term revision process, Kickstarter’s general
counsel, Michal Rosenn, asked an intern to distinguish, in the
firm’s existing (and standard) terms and conditions, the content
that was necessary and core to the company’s needs from the additional detritus. Rosenn deliberately decided to pare down the
terms while not asserting protections that added little business
value—forced arbitration and class action waivers, for instance—
in part because they seemed like an overreach of power.143
Rosenn and a nonlawyer then worked to redraft the existing
terms to make them clear and jargon free. They had seen
Tumblr’s terms of use (and indeed Kickstarter is a part of the
same small community of New York–based startups, originally
funded by the same venture firm, that use the same outside counsel).144 Like Tumblr, Kickstarter created simple, easy-to-read
summaries of each section of its terms of use and framed them in
bright blue boxes at the beginning of each section. It begins:

142 Charter (Kickstarter, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/PJQ3-PH3B. Rosenn,
noting that the charter postdated the revision, suggested that the former’s language reflected the firm’s motivation and attitude during the reform process. Interview with
Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101).
143 In fact, the terms of use operative from 2012 to 2014 did not contain an arbitration
clause, though they did contain a choice of forum clause (New York). Terms of Use
(Kickstarter, Oct 2012) (“Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2012”), archived at
http://perma.cc/PRU5-NRH9.
144 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
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FIGURE 5: KICKSTARTER TERMS OF USE: SUMMARY (2014)145

Like many sites, for example, Kickstarter requires users to
avoid bad behavior. But its Dos and Don’ts section begins, again,
with a blue box that contains the following text: “This section is a
list of things you probably already know you shouldn’t do—lie,
break laws, abuse people, steal data, hack other people’s computers, and so on. Please behave yourself. Don’t do this stuff.”146
Rosenn reports that the translation provided reputational
benefits for Kickstarter as well as an improved relationship with
users.147 The major substantive change in the terms clarified the
responsibilities and expectations of creators and backers when it
comes to funding projects: the old (buried) language inaccurately
overpromised refunds, and Kickstarter wanted to better reflect
the practices and expectations around funding on the site.148
Given those goals, it’s helpful to compare the old and the new
versions of the same provision. First, the operative terms as they
existed from 2012 through 2014:

145 Terms of Use (Kickstarter, Oct 19, 2014) (“Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2014”), archived at http://perma.cc/V98K-8U7R.
146 Id.
147 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101).
148 See Sarah Perez, Kickstarter Updates Terms of Use Section Related to Failed
Projects (Techcrunch, Sept 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/MZ76-BKKD; Casey
Johnston, Kickstarter Lays Down New Rules for When a Project Fails (ArsTechnica, Sept
21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PHH2-3XVH.
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FIGURE 6: KICKSTARTER TERMS OF USE: OPERATIVE TERMS
(2012–2014)149

These terms leave significant ambiguity about what happens
if projects fail. Talk of “good faith attempt” and “Project Creators
149

Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2012 (cited in note 143).
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are required to . . . refund any Backer” contrasts with disclaimers that “Kickstarter does not offer refunds.”150 The revised
terms (as of 2014), by contrast, break out the responsibilities of
backers and creators. Here is the language on backers (which is,
for our purposes, key):
FIGURE 7: KICKSTARTER TERMS OF USE: BACKERS (2014)151

150
151

Id.
Kickstarter Terms of Use, 2014 (cited in note 145).
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The revision makes much clearer what rights are reserved:
the language is cleaner and the font easier to parse. It’s consequently not implausible to believe that (according to Rosenn)
users sent positive feedback about the change, and Kickstarter
has seen fewer questions from users as well.152 Moreover, backers,
who communicate with creators, rely on and cite the terms of use
frequently, suggesting that they have real uptake.153
C.

Etsy: Handcrafted Terms

A third site is Etsy, also a community for which user buy-in
is crucial to the business model. Etsy, like Kickstarter, decided to
translate existing terms of use that were “just as generic and ugly
as every other generic terms of service out there.”154 Indeed, they
began with a dreaded block of ALLCAPS text:
FIGURE 8: ETSY TERMS OF USE: INTRODUCTION (2013)155

152

Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101).
Id.
154 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103). Bajwa was previously senior
counsel at Etsy and the founder and CEO of SpotlessCity.
155 Terms of Use (Etsy, Nov 15, 2013) (“Etsy Terms of Use, 2013”), archived at
http://perma.cc/P8US-EW25.
153
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The change was initiated by a lawyer at the company, Hissan
Bajwa (who is now general counsel at another startup). Bajwa
noted that the existing terms were dissonant with the mission
and look of the rest of Etsy’s trade dress:
We use the word handcrafted a lot. . . . [A]ll these other teams
are spending all this time making their pieces of the company—their turf—look and feel and reflect who we believe we
are as a company. . . . We the legal team are looking like robot
lawyers drafting all these legalistic documents that were a
nightmare for our community members to work off of. That’s
where it came from.156
Bajwa, with the permission of the firm’s then–general counsel, began by working on the key document, the terms of use. He
decided to “[t]ear it up and start over.”157 But because of the
relationship of that document to other contracts, the project
quickly expanded. He joined with Bonnie Broeren, who heads
Etsy’s policy team. Their first goal was to create a unique style
guide on how to write its terms and conditions. The objective of
that guide was (according to the people who worked on it) to
“write policies that are enforceable from a legal perspective, but
still human and accessible from a member perspective.”158 An entire section of that guide was dedicated to voice, with instructions
on how to write legal terms. To create the guide, Etsy’s lawyers
worked with “product, engineering and design teams to see what
would be possible.”159 The resulting product is a balance of text on
the page and headings that had an “impactful presence on the
page.”160
As Bajwa pointed out, it’s rare for lawyers to have access to
engineering resources. In Etsy’s case, the resources were fortuitously available:
[The] internal tools team was working [at that very time] on
improving our blog and our education content. We thought
hold on a second, you are making the seller handbook look and

156

Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
Id.
158 Email from Bonnie Broeren, Head of Policy, Etsy, to David A. Hoffman (Mar 27,
2017, 11:09 am EDT) (“Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am”) (on file with author);
Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103) (“We came up with this style guide or
lexicon so that [the house rules] will be treated as a unit, . . . in the same voice.”).
159 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158).
160 Id.
157
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feel better. Why don’t we piggyback on that work and give us
a little bit of custom design and graphics? . . . Once [we]
frame[d] it as this is very important to our customer service
team to reduce their workload, it is hard to argue against it.161
The joint team unified the various policies into a single integrated system: Etsy’s “house rules.”162 Today, those house rules
have a distinctive look and feel. Section and paragraph headers
are in plain and clear English: “Be honest with us,” “Let’s be clear
about our relationship,” “Rights You Grant Etsy,” and “Don’t
Steal Our Stuff.”163 And with respect to particular provisions, Etsy
explains why it needs the rights it does, particularly the intellectual property rights it takes.164
Thus, compare the pre- and postlicensing rules. The prerevision section starts with a negative (“does not claim ownership”)
and then provides a lengthy license description, with an embedded link to a privacy policy:
FIGURE 9: ETSY TERMS OF USE: LICENSE DESCRIPTION (2013)165

161

Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
Terms of Use (Etsy, Jan 2, 2018) (“Etsy Terms of Use, 2018”), archived at
http://perma.cc/L53G-HHQ2.
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 Etsy Terms of Use, 2013 (cited in note 155).
162
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The same section postrevision is more colloquial, and it starts
with affirmative claims (“[c]ontent that you post using our
Services is your content”) and concrete examples.166 It refers to
norms of behavior (responsibility) rather than exclusively to legal
rules. And, notably, it first provides a nonlegal version of the
rules, then a legal version, and then a justification. The result is
a set of rights that aren’t substantively different but that are
more clearly explained:
FIGURE 10: ETSY TERMS OF USE (REVISED)167

166
167

Etsy Terms of Use, 2018 (cited in note 162).
Id.
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This sense of translation is made more explicit by actual illustrations of the terms. For example, Etsy demonstrates the requirement that sellers list handmade items for sale with the following illustration:
FIGURE 11: ETSY ILLUSTRATION168

Etsy tested these changes in two ways. It created different
versions of the policies with a tool called “Etsy Impressions,”
which showed sellers particular policies and asked them to highlight sections and give the firm feedback.169 It also ran focus
groups with sellers and invited feedback on the changed policies.
In so doing, the team proposed to “make sure the people who will
be bound by our policies actually understand them.”170
After the terms rolled out, the policy team measured their
success by talking to support teams to see if particular provisions
were creating friction or resolving it, by monitoring user communication with each other, and by looking at how Etsy’s terms were
described in the press.171 Broeren, cautioning that Etsy’s support
teams still field complaints and concerns from users, noted:
We did . . . see our members positively discussing our policies
in our forums, mentioning that they trusted us more than
some of our competitors as a result of our easy-to-read policies. We also saw some positive press coverage. Regarding
our customer support teams, I would say that incorporating
168 Handmade Policy (Etsy, Feb 22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4642-HHL4.
Etsy hoped that “fun illustrations” would “clarify what we were saying in the accompanying text.” Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158).
169 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158).
170 Id.
171 See id.

2018]

Relational Contracts of Adhesion

1437

their perspectives is critical to our success as we continue to
tweak our policies. They are usually on the front lines of any
member dissatisfaction.172
And, according to Bajwa, though it is hard to articulate a
monetary return for the revision, the site’s users appeared less
confused and more likely to rely on their own reading of the terms
to guide conduct, and the internal customer support workers were
less frustrated with the legal department as a result.173
D. Airbnb: Solving a Public Relations Crisis
Airbnb, the short-term rental site, had a problem. Three researchers had shown that guest applications with distinctively
African American names were less likely to be accepted by hosts,
and they argued that the platform’s design facilitated that outcome.174 Rob Chesnut, in his second week as general counsel of the
company, was quickly put on his back foot: having not anticipated
the issue, “we were forced to take it on reactively, [which is] not
the ideal way to do it.”175 Chesnut reports that the firm was a bit
surprised by the issue because “our founders and company are in
[S]an Francisco, [which is] culturally very tolerant.”176 But once
the issue “blew up,” the firm had to decide what to do.177
One option, according to Chesnut, would be the “standard
legal approach” as a platform: disclaiming responsibility for
renters’ behavior.178 Instead, the company decided the right option was to declare that “we own this, we want to be better than
this. . . . We’re not going to be driven by legal issues here. We’re
going to be driven by what’s important to our mission and our
community.”179 Chesnut wrote a first draft of an entirely new nondiscrimination policy, carved out of the existing TOS to “call it

172 Email from Bonnie Broeren, Head of Policy, Etsy, to David A. Hoffman (May 26,
2017, 2:22 pm EDT) (“Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:22 pm”) (on file with author).
173 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
174 See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, and Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in
the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 Am Econ J: Applied Econ 1,
2–3 (2017).
175 Telephone Interview with Rob Chesnut, General Counsel, Airbnb (Apr 14, 2017)
(“Interview with Rob Chesnut”) (on file with author).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175).
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out.”180 That draft’s goal was to “sound authentic and human” rather than lawyerly.181
Chesnut sent the draft to two well-known lawyers, Eric
Holder (the former US attorney general) and John Relman, a crusading civil rights and housing lawyer, both of whom played a key
role in its drafting process.182 As Chesnut noted, the two lawyers
and their respective teams “each worked on different elements of
[the policy]. . . . In the end, we came up with something that is
very Airbnb. It’s not crafted by lawyers for legal protection.”183
The policy itself is, indeed, straightforward and written in a
clear and accessible style. Unlike the earlier examples I discuss,
there are no visual cues or callouts: Chesnut specifically described
“an effort to be authentic, but not legalese, but not cute. There
was an intentional effort to keep it simple.”184 Thus, the terms
permit and prohibit behavior, often in the same section:
FIGURE 12: AIRBNB NONDISCRIMINATION POLICY185

180

Id.
Id.
182 Id. For discussion of Holder’s role at Airbnb, see David McCabe, Airbnb Enlists
Civil Rights Leaders in Discrimination Fight (The Hill, Sept 11, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/4NKK-XLRS; Brian Chesky, An Update on the Airbnb Anti-Discrimination
Review (Airbnb, July 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/J6W3-ADW3.
183 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175).
184 Id.
185 Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to Inclusion and Respect
(Airbnb), archived at http://perma.cc/TU6W-ZNLH.
181
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The policy describes the prohibition on discrimination as an
aspect of Airbnb’s mission of “bringing the world closer together
by fostering meaningful, shared experiences among people from
all parts of the world.”186 That is, like the preceding examples,
Airbnb deliberately tried to align its brand with the terms to
make them more persuasive. Generally speaking, Airbnb’s policy
rollout resulted in positive press,187 though questions remain
about whether it in fact alleviates implicit bias.188
Chesnut stated that Airbnb did not test out different versions
of the policy language, though it had been conducting experiments on different placement of pictures and reviews to encourage user behavior that the firm desires.189 Though Airbnb required every user to click to agree to the policy, Chesnut
acknowledged that the document itself would require continuous
monitoring and tweaking through an internal compliance team
that surfaces difficult cases and sends them to a committee tasked
with refining the rules over time.190
There has been a small (under 5 percent) loss in users, which
Chesnut attributes to the policy.191 But Chesnut admitted that
Airbnb has chosen not to conduct its own testing to see if users
are discriminating in ways prohibited by the rules.192 Though the
nondiscrimination policy “is particularly important,” looks different from most terms and conditions, and comes “from the heart of
the firm,” Airbnb’s legal response to discrimination appears in
some ways to still be reactive.193

186

Id.
See, for example, Katie Benner, Airbnb Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by
Its Hosts (NY Times, Sept 8, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/
technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive
unavailable).
188 See Ruomeng Cui, Jun Li, and Dennis J. Zhang, Discrimination with Incomplete
Information in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb *25–26
(Dec 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9QJH-ZMFN (finding evidence that discrimination persists even after the change in terms).
189 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. After I talked with Chesnut, the firm announced that it had reached a settlement with a California regulator to allow the state to conduct such tests on its behalf. See
Sam Levin, Airbnb Gives in to Regulator’s Demand to Test for Racial Discrimination by
Hosts (The Guardian, Apr 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q63W-XZEZ.
193 See Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175).
187
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Bumble: We’re Not Tinder

Finally, let’s return to Bumble’s funny terms. Bumble is
sometimes described as the “feminist Tinder.”194 But according to
Miranda Lerner, a lawyer who was involved with its legal operations at its founding, Bumble sought at its launch to distinguish
itself from Tinder.195 Lerner (and Wolfe, Bumble’s founder) resolved to use the new app’s TOS as a differentiation engine.
Lerner worked over several days with a team of younger
paralegals and another in-house lawyer. They helped her design
a set of terms that felt “young” and “cool.”196 The resulting language was sent to a law firm that inserted more formal (“very legal”) amendments.197 Over a month, that process iterated, with
the aim of fusing together the desired tone with the exculpatory
language that Bumble’s outside counsel required. Indeed, after
the “mumbo jumbo” language that introduces this Part, Bumble’s
terms do in fact revert to legalese:
No failure or delay in exercising any right, power or privilege
under the Terms shall operate as a waiver of such right or
acceptance of any variation of the Terms and nor shall any
single or partial exercise by either party of any right, power
or privilege preclude any further exercise of the right or the
exercise of any other right, power or privilege.198
Were readers more likely to be guided by the framing around
this passage?199 Lerner, an experienced entrepreneur and counselor, acknowledged that individuals rarely if ever read the terms
and conditions of any app—that the terms’ real audience (apart
from courts) was journalists who might peruse them at the app’s

194 Jessica Bennet, With Her Dating App, Women Are in Control (NY Times, Mar 18,
2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/fashion/bumble-feminist-dating-app
-whitney-wolfe.html (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
195 Telephone Interview with Miranda Lerner (Jun 9, 2017) (“Interview with Miranda
Lerner”) (on file with author). Lerner was Head of Legal at Bumble from 2014 through
2016. The app launched during her tenure. Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Bumble Terms and Conditions (cited in note 111).
199 There is evidence that firms may motivate information acquisition by teasing mysteries. See, for example, Dina Mayzlin and Jiwoong Shin, Uninformative Advertising as
an Invitation to Search, 30 Marketing Science 666, 680 (2011) (reporting experimental
findings that vague advertising “may increase consumers’ likelihood to search for information about the product”). But Bumble did the opposite: it suggested that there was
nothing worth learning in the terms.
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launch. That is, Bumble’s terms sounded different explicitly because of its branding strategy.200
At launch, Bumble’s interesting terms may have helped convince journalists that Bumble’s product was virtuous.201 Lerner
pointed out that she knew of no backlash to Bumble’s terms and
that the product was successfully made distinct. In this way, the
terms “[p]rotect[ed the] brand from criticism.”202 At the same
time, she argued that the clearly written terms helped the firm
“argue [its] case back to [the] customer.”203 They did so by making
the rights themselves clearer (thus leaving less room for interpretative dispute). But also, by injecting humor, Lerner believes that
the internal consumer service teams were better able to work out
for themselves how to deal with complaints: they could send consumers links to disarming terms rather than “piss[ing] them off
with legal language.”204
IV. FROM OPTIONS TO RELATIONAL CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
What can we learn from these case studies? At the gross level,
they provide examples of commercially important platform economy firms that appear to be using mass-market contracts in novel
ways. At the very least, those contracts are functioning as extensions of the firms’ trade dress: they are more likely to (in Etsy’s
words) “look and feel and reflect who we believe we are as a company.”205 But according to some of the drafters whose work we’ve
studied, the terms’ ambition was larger: to actually enable userparticipants to more easily read, learn from, and work with the
terms in resolving disputes with each other. That is, the terms
were intended to regulate.
Stepping back from the detail allows us to consider whether
these distinctive contracting moments come together to illustrate
a new way that some contracts might work in the sharing economy. I believe they do: mass-market contracts govern behavior by
200

See Interview with Miranda Lerner (cited in note 195).
I found only a few examples from contemporaneous sources lauding the terms.
See, for example, Bumble Buzzes over to Android (Droid Report, Dec 14, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/NJ5X-2UZ8 (“[Bumble’s] Terms and Conditions also indicate that the
app will police for abusive, threatening and even defamatory or libelous language and
content, as well as content that is ‘obscene, pornographic or otherwise may offend human
dignity.’”).
202 Interview with Miranda Lerner (cited in note 195).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
201
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making adhesive contracts extensions of the firm’s brand. These
contracts take on relational and discrete attributes.206 They are a
new phenomenon, what I call “relational contracts of adhesion.”207
What the case studies do not do is provide a general theory
explaining why it was these firms that innovated, nor do they do
a very good job of predicting when innovation will next arise (if it
does). After all, the vast majority of firms, including almost all
new economy platform firms, have terms and conditions that are
ordinary in form and function. The ultimate goal of this Part is to
provide a set of research directions to help us better understand
this space. Before doing so, I work to synthesize what we’ve
learned so far.
A.

Branding and Mass-Market Contracts

Most of the case studies started with a problem: a firm with
hundreds of thousands or millions of counterparties wanted to affect those individuals’ behavior without spending excessive time
policing them. In each case, for various reasons, that behavioral
problem fell into the lap of a lawyer who decided to adapt a traditionally inert form to a new use. To review:
• Tumblr needed to find a way to embed its terms within the
firm’s mission of motivating creative production by users.208
• Kickstarter needed a way to better channel investor-users
when their projects failed and thus reduce reputational blowback
to the firm.209

206 For a general discussion of relational contracting, see generally Ian R. MacNeil,
Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw U L Rev 877 (2000). See also
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va L Rev 1089,
1091 (1981) (“A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.”).
207 Others, notably Professor Ethan Leib, have suggested that courts should evaluate
consumer contracts using relational doctrines. See Ethan J. Lieb, What Is the Relational
Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C.
Whitford, eds, Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the
Empirical and the Lyrical 259, 277–80 (Hart 2013). Leib claims that such contracts function as bureaucratic plans that stand not on particular assent to terms but rather “consensual entry into already legitimate relations.” Id at 269. He would police terms using the
reasonable expectations doctrine. Id at 276. There is much in this work that I agree with,
but of course my focus is different: adhesive contracts that are intended to be read and to
influence ex ante behavior.
208 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 5:45 pm (cited in note 100).
209 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101).
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• Etsy sought to decrease the likelihood of user behavior that
reflected badly on the company because it was leading to friction
with Etsy and a loss of the site’s ability to be a trusted platform.210
• Airbnb needed to reduce user discrimination (or at least be
plausibly seen as doing so).211
The changes were substantive. For the first three firms, the
changes involved abandoning or not taking up remedial limitations and defenses to actions by users;212 for Airbnb, the changes
increased the firm’s explicit responsibility for preventing discrimination.213 By adding translations, each firm also took on the risk
that a court would interpret the translated text differently from
the “legal” text. 214 By avoiding new exculpatory clauses while also
adding a layer of uncertainty to the judicial reception of existing
terms, all four firms thus increased their formal legal exposure.
At the same time, each explicitly worked to avoid legalese and
focus on simple, declarative sentences. All except for Airbnb also
presented the terms with some playful humor and informality, as
well as some visual cues and displays.
Bumble’s goals in creating its terms were different. Unlike
the previous examples, it did not already have a user base, let
alone one that participated as moneymaking participants on a
“platform.” Rather, Bumble explicitly sought to use contract to
distinguish and sharpen its brand.215 It did so by projecting youth
and informality, perhaps hoping to convince key gatekeeping

210

Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:22 pm (cited in note 172).
Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175).
212 Etsy’s original and modified terms contained an arbitration provision, though the
original terms provided for fees to the prevailing party while the modified terms did not.
Compare Etsy Terms of Use, 2018 (cited in note 162), with Etsy Terms of Use, 2013 (cited
in note 155).
213 See Part III.D.
214 Professor Curtis Anderson, formerly the general counsel of the Match Group (of
Match.com and Tinder), told me that Match decided not to follow the Tumblr and Etsy
model for terms because of a judgment that a two-track model for terms (and additional
illustrations) added legal risk that courts would render important legal protections for the
firm unenforceable. Telephone Interview with Curtis Anderson, Associate Teaching
Professor, Brigham Young University Law School (Apr 20, 2017) (“Interview with Curtis
Anderson”) (on file with author).
215 In addition to the Tinder relationship discussed above, I found reference in contemporaneous press to concerns about Bumble’s relationship to Badoo, a well-known
European social networking and dating site that had been criticized for its privacy practices. See Steve O’Hear, Tinder Rival Bumble Is Majority-Owned by European Dating
Behemoth Badoo (TechCrunch, Mar 25, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2H3E-945V. To
the extent that Bumble wished to signal its distance from that criticism, informal terms
would seem to have been a useful approach.
211
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journalists to write stories that would emphasize that Bumble
was a “feminist” dating app.216
Thus, one key lesson is that firms are trying to enhance their
brands using mass-market contracts.217 Indeed, by combining
terms, tone, and look, firms can make their legal rules part of the
firm’s trade dress.218 As Shahdadi pointed out, Tumblr’s playful
approach to terms succeeded in grabbing attention on the web
and branding the firm as a humane and trustworthy firm.219 At
Etsy, it was the incongruence of ordinary terms with the site’s
brand that motivated the project,220 and the team, justifying the
new terms, claimed that they “can even provide a competitive advantage over other companies whose terms are more difficult to
understand.”221 Airbnb’s general counsel noted that its revised
policy was “very Airbnb,” both aesthetically and in terms of congruence with its mission.222
This trade dress–centered understanding of functional terms
is not entirely novel. A famous example of cobranding using legal
material comes from the online gaming firm Zynga. In the leadup to the firm’s initial public offering, it launched a social game
through its website that taught users about its privacy policy and
linked to reward chits that could be used in related games (like
FarmVille).223 That gamification of the privacy rules received very
positive coverage as well as laudatory attention in the world of

216

See Interview with Miranda Lerner (cited in note 195).
Others have suggested that contracts can serve a branding function, though not
in the consumer context. See, for example, Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO:
Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12 Harv Negotiation L Rev 137, 153 (2007) (focusing on
MasterCard’s transactional structuring as a form of brand enhancement); D. Gordon
Smith, The “Branding Effect” of Contracts, 12 Harv Negotiation L Rev 189, 195–98 (2007)
(discussing the information-conveying function of contracts in the venture capital context).
218 I mean this in the colloquial sense—I’m not sure that the TOS would meet the
Lanham Act definition of trade dress, in part because they are functional. See Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc v Dempster, 764 F3d 303, 309 (3d Cir 2014) (identifying elements of trade
dress infringement, including that the infringing design be “nonfunctional”).
219 See, for example, Caroline Moss, Tumblr’s Hilarious New Legal Terms of Service
Include a Ban on Pretending to Be Benedict Cumberbatch (Business Insider, Jan 30, 2014),
online at http://www.businessinsider.com/tumblrs-new-terms-of-service-is-inspiring-and
-funny-2014-1 (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). I am not arguing that
the motivation for change by Shahdadi was primarily instrumental. I think he held a sincere belief that it was, in fact, the right thing to do. Rather, he was able to justify his
motivation in terms that spoke across constituencies.
220 See Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
221 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158).
222 Interview with Rob Chesnut (cited in note 175).
223 Julie Beck, Zynga Inc.: Game-ification, InsideCounsel 58 (Sept 2012).
217

2018]

Relational Contracts of Adhesion

1445

privacy policy.224 According to Jay Monahan, the lawyer at Zynga
most responsible for the product’s rollout, it also had three additional positive attributes. It helped to establish a positive
relationship between the firm and the Federal Trade
Commission,225 which had recently released a report on the importance of privacy transparency.226 It increased readership of the
underlying privacy policies.227 And, significantly for our purposes,
it aligned with the firm’s mission and brand that games could be
both entertaining and educational.228
As others, notably Professor Danielle Citron, have suggested,
firms can enforce their TOS in a way that signals their allegiance
to larger social campaigns,229 highlighting virtues and thus gaining reputational capital.230 For example, MySpace changed its
TOS to ban certain kinds of speech and enforced those bans with
aggressive moderation. These efforts helped the firm “by creating
market niches and contributing to consumer goodwill.”231 Others,
including Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz, have argued that firms
should modulate the tone of their EULAs to “build goodwill with
consumers.”232 But the idea that harmonizing the look and feel of
terms can help make them functional has yet to be explored.
Understanding how these terms work as extensions of the
firm’s brand is jarring. There is something odd about the idea that
hypermodern sharing economy firms try to advance their hipster
credentials with that most antiquated behavioral tool of all: a contract. Indeed, the message can be easily confused: Bumble says,
on the one hand, “We’re relaxed and hip enough to say that law is
bunk,” but on the other hand, “Our lawyers insist that you are

224 See, for example, Will Simonds, Getting from PrivacyVille to the Real World of Online
Privacy (The Online Privacy Blog, July 8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8ZL7-W6AE
(characterizing the gamified privacy policy as “an inspired step in the right direction”).
225 Telephone Interview with Jay Monahan (Jan 3, 2018) (“Interview with Jay
Monahan”) (on file with author).
226 See Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers (Dec 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/2X5N-EPXB.
227 Interview with Jay Monahan (cited in note 225).
228 Id.
229 See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 Mich L Rev 373, 412–13 (2009).
230 See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 230–31 (cited in note 41).
231 Id at 229.
232 Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 696 (cited in note 86).
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bound by bunk.”233 Airbnb may be seeking to put out a public relations fire by suggesting that it has a better way of communicating with users (though, in reality, it may not actually care if
users read the policy). Thus, there is an element of false consciousness here: terms might be gaining user trust, and
regulators’ approval, through a revision that in fact does little of
substance.
This dystopian vision of the sharing economy has been forcefully advanced by Professor Ryan Calo, culminating in his coauthored exposé of Uber’s predatory behavior, Taking Economy.234
Calo argues that, because firms have the opportunity to learn
about users en masse and the motive to exploit their vulnerabilities, we ought to be concerned lest actions that they take couched
in the new economy’s language of freedom and choice confuse us
about the reality of exploitation on the ground. Thus, one way to
see the case studies I present is as wolfish firms successfully
branding themselves as sheep.235
While this story is plausible for some firms, it doesn’t really
capture the phenomenon at work here. Apart from Bumble, and
perhaps Airbnb, each of our case study firms increased its legal
exposure to suits by making it harder (on the margins) to exercise
defensive clauses. The lawyers I spoke to said that they were comfortable with this trade not only because of the benefits it secured
in terms of user buy-in, but also because the change fit with a
larger public brand that the firm was eager to extend. And, apart
from Bumble, the lawyers pushing the change stressed their internal motivation to do the right thing as an important or motivating factor in the particular sorts of choices that were made.

233 This relates to a point made by Citron about how vague TOS can dilute expressive
messages. Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 231 (cited in note 41) (explaining that
“[t]he more clearly and specifically companies explain those terms and the harms that
they want to prevent, the better users will understand what is expected of them”).
234 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 995, 1018 (2014)
(“A firm with the resources and inclination will be in a position to surface and exploit how
consumers tend to deviate from rational decisionmaking on a previously unimaginable
scale.”); Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1623 (cited in note 8) (arguing that contracting is a way that firms like Uber exploit their drivers).
235 See Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering Humanity ch 4
(Cambridge 2018) (arguing that consumer contracts are shaping preferences in nefarious
ways).
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The Costs and Consequences of Innovations

The firms provide different models for producing terms—
from one that was determined by lawyers (Kickstarter, Airbnb,
and Bumble), to a collaboration between the general counsel and
CEO with informal user feedback (Tumblr), to an interdisciplinary team with regularized user feedback (Etsy).236
These different processes reveal how the task of redrafting
the fine print can have organizational consequences inside the
firm. Revision of terms reveals something about firm culture: as
Shahdadi says, “I would never farm this task out—it’s core to
every company. . . . [N]ext time I would be more aggressive and
do most of the work myself.”237 That is, when firms think about
how to make precatory fine print functional, they might come to
learn things about themselves. This organizing function of disclosure is an important, but understudied, phenomenon. As
Professor Peter Swire, explaining the beneficent effects of required financial privacy disclosures, puts it:
I contend that a principal effect of the notices has been to
require financial institutions to inspect their own practices.
. . . In order to draft the notice, many financial institutions
undertook an extensive process, often for the first time, to
learn just how data is and is not shared between different
parts of the organization and with third parties. Based on my
extensive discussions with people in the industry, I believe
that many institutions discovered practices that they decided, upon deliberation, to change.238
Arguably, this kind of focusing effect can be socially useful
even if it isn’t terribly effective at directly changing behavior. The
mere fact that the firm has thought about how to write terms that

236 See Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103) (“Unlike most or many consumer sites, we have an active community and our sellers are an active community who
read every word of this.”). See also Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 700–01 (cited in
note 86) (arguing that, in the software industry, lawyers’ exclusive role in drafting terms
hampers user-friendliness).
237 Email from Ari Shahdadi, 3:08 pm (cited in note 99).
238 Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 Minn
L Rev 1263, 1316 (2002) (contending that disclosure requirements trigger selfexamination by firms).
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tell users not to be obnoxious may influence it to invest more effort in how to prevent corrosive user conduct, leading to innovations in page design.239
For example, at Etsy, the revision process required the legal
and policy team to talk with a variety of stakeholders within the
firm. While the older terms had a “Frankensteinian” aspect, the
new ones were designed to be coherent.240 Some of the conversations required translation of technical concepts (like the payment
and direct checkout system).241 Though they got a “gut check” from
outside counsel, the inside legal team spent a considerable
amount of time trying to coordinate the views of diverse internal
audiences and making sure they were on (literally) one page.242
One question is whether it is possible to entirely outsource
the project of producing functional precatory contracts. As it turns
out, a firm called Snapterms tried, between 2011 and 2014, to sell
terms with a sense of humor to small businesses with relatively
simple consumer sales interfaces. It was marketed extensively,
with features on popular websites, as a place where you could get
semicustomizable terms for a fixed price.243 Over three years the
firm sold 2,200 contracts, and around 10 percent of customers
paid extra for humorous inserts.244 As an example, consider the
site’s own description of its services:
Snapterms is a legal service for people who don’t want to
mortgage their house to hire a traditional law firm.
Snapterms, in turn, consists of an elite team of lawyers who
have made the career decision to whore ourselves out at bargain basement prices. How do we keep prices so low? Well,
we can’t really discuss trade secrets, but it involves a giant
239 See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace at 232 (cited in note 41) (describing the
Inter-Parliamentary Task Force on Internet Hate’s Anti-Cyberhate Working Group’s discussions about “developing guidelines that will help users better understand terms-ofservice requirements”).
240 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
241 Id.
242 Id. In some ways, Etsy’s process followed the model process laid out by
Gomulkiewicz for how one might design a user-friendly contract, though there is no evidence that they knew of his work. See Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 703–05 (cited
in note 86) (detailing the model process, which includes using an interdisciplinary team
and creating terms that are cohesive, user-friendly, and well designed).
243 See Sarah Perez, SnapTerms: Terms of Service as a Service (TechCrunch, Apr 13,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3XXC-KVPT.
244 Telephone Interview with Hansen Tong (Apr 27, 2017) (“Interview with Hansen
Tong”) (on file with author). Tong was a co-owner of Snapterms and one of the individuals
involved with its business operations until it closed for a “pivot” in late 2014.
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mill contraption like in Conan the Barbarian, but with a
bunch of lawyers chained to it.245
Unlike the in-house examples I discuss, Snapterms did not
attempt to actually ensure that its terms were more readable (or
read) than the alternative. Though it hired advertising copywriters to create humorous inserts, it did not test its product’s readability, or actual reader comprehension, in a scientific way.246
Snapterms borrowed some of its ideas for humor and explanatory
phrases from other websites and did not attempt to tie its explanations into its clients’ brands or identity.247 Thus, it is unclear
whether outsourcing is a viable solution to the no-reading problem.
These stories show how weak, in the end, are explanations
that blame lawyers for failures to innovate around terms. It was
lawyers at Kickstarter, Etsy, and Tumblr (among others) who innovated around contracts in their respective firms and solved
pressing business problems. They were not uniquely risk-seeking,
even though they did come from the same New York–based entrepreneurial law community.248 That is, innovation and legal training are not incompatible.
Then why did these firms innovate when others did not? I
think the reasons are many but start with a compelling business
logic.249 Bumble is the clearest case, though its terms are the least
innovative. Plainly, it saw informal terms as an inexpensive
branding play: the incongruity between legalese and informality
was a virtuous signal that the firm was run by real people who
could be trusted to behave well—not only with respect to what’s
245 Snapterms.com
Terms of Service (Snapterms, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/AHA9-REQN.
246 Obviously, the Snapterms team did monitor client feedback (which was positive)
and followed reviews online at places like Reddit to be sure that the market regarded its
terms as clear. My point is that it did not design processes to learn about the terms in a
more rigorous way. See Interview with Hansen Tong (cited in note 244) (noting that they
spent time improving the readability of the indemnification, representations and warranties, and limitations on liability terms).
247 Id (explaining that Snapterms bought legal terms from LegalZoom, hired copywriters to insert humor, and looked to Tumblr in drafting explanatory phrases).
248 Indeed, Etsy, Tumblr, and Kickstarter arose from the same venture capital fund,
Union Square Ventures, and share an outside counsel, Gunderson Dettmer. Interview
with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
249 One driver of innovation might be that the firms I studied had relatively simple
business models and relatively low risk exposures. Match.com, by contrast, was exposed
to a high likelihood of user-generated lawsuits, including for tortious conduct by other
users that might be attributed to the firm. Interview with Curtis Anderson (cited in note
214). The audience for Match’s terms and conditions was courts and regulators, not primarily consumers. Id.
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disclosed but also how the firm will behave when no one is looking.250 A firm that casually refers to law as “mumbo jumbo” may
seem like the affable type that is unlikely to sell your information
to the nearest data aggregator. Bumble needed to send out that
message in part because of the circumstances of its founding: its
terms simply could not follow the standard and sterile playbook.251
The other case examples provide a more complex set of motivations. Because their customers are often also merchants, who
often build businesses and brands on the platform, the studied
firms have users with a vested interest in the content of the terms
and who care greatly about the performance-shaping rules that
they contain. Someone who buys on Etsy might also become someone who sells on the site: the “house rules” are addressed to an
intensely attentive audience. As Etsy’s representative explained
to me: “We want our members to trust us, and writing policies
that are easy to understand is a big part of earning that trust.”252
Similarly, Kickstarter derives its revenue by being seen as a
trusted intermediary between a mass of internet “investors” and
a smaller number of firms: the terms of use are the constitutive
document, meant to be understood and read by all, as opposed to
only those for whom deals go bad. And Tumblr users will often
bemoan their exclusion from the community, as hard-built personal brands disappear overnight.253
In other words, even old-fashioned, monopolistic lawyers
write readable mass contracts (which might also be read) when
both firms and their “customers” demand them. But when users
(or reporters) aren’t motivated to pay attention, firms’ incentives
to innovate are reduced, and it starts to make more sense to stick
with the status quo.254 That is, just as in other fields, new entrants

250 For an analogous example of this sort of playing with law in trademark, see Don’t
Say Velcro (Velcro Brand, Sept 25, 2017), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
rRi8LptvFZY (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
251 This is in accord with Professor Victor Fleischer’s insight about “branding
moments” in a corporation’s life, when otherwise sterile forms (like a charter) can further
its brand. Fleischer, 12 Harv Negotiation L Rev at 151–53 (cited in note 217); Victor
Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 Mich
L Rev 1581, 1600, 1628 (2006) (explaining that branding moments are most important
early in a company’s life).
252 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 11:09 am (cited in note 158).
253 See Gavia Baker-Whitelaw, Tumblr Users Panic as Accounts Are Deleted for
Copyright Violations (The Daily Dot, Feb 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CUP5-S25Q.
254 See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 Chi Kent L Rev 59,
78–80 (2001) (highlighting the challenges of changing terms in contracts); Clayton P.
Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 BU L Rev 813, 819 (1998) (contrasting the
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and outsiders innovate. Thus, we can see innovation that makes
terms more communicative (or at least seem to be more communicative) as akin to innovation in the terms themselves: they result from learning, over time, about the firm’s market position
and the returns that it will reap from change.255
Innovation is expensive; Etsy’s lawyers noted that “cost sensitivity” matters here.256 Indeed, as Bajwa lamented, the revision
process took six months, much of it on nights and weekends
carved out from the day-to-day work of being a lawyer for a busy
and growing firm.257 For most general counsel at most firms, renovating the terms and conditions to make sure that terms that
command obedience are understandable simply isn’t high on the
priority list. Bajwa continued:
Now that I’m GC at a new and much younger startup, when
I look at my priorities right now with much fewer resources
and a company that is in a much different position, I can’t
justify devoting time to focusing on the terms of service
here. . . . Our user base is not interested [in the same way as
Etsy’s]. If they are legally sound that is fine for now.258
This suggests that the market for terms like those I describe
might be constrained. Similarly, Kickstarter’s Rosenn pointed out
that existing terms “get the job done” by mitigating risk. In the
hurly burly of the day, with competing demands on a general
counsel’s time, marginally improving the terms is usually cost
prohibitive: it’s a “challenging” task to “force yourself outside of
the lawyer lens and think about language and policies in a more
human way.”259
More generally, general counsel argue that the time spent on
terms is quite difficult to justify in a world in which much of what
must be contained in terms of use is mandated by law or compelled by solving transnational compliance problems. According
lack of contract innovation with innovation in technology); Henry T. Greely, Contracts as
Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 Vand L
Rev 133, 168 (1989) (comparing the difficulty of innovation in standardized contract terms
to trying to change the dominant QWERTY keyboard layout).
255 Davis, 88 NYU L Rev at 108 (cited in note 106) (explaining that innovation results
from “learning-by-doing”).
256 Email from Bonnie Broeren, 2:17 pm (cited in note 102).
257 Interview with Hissan Bajwa (cited in note 103).
258 Id. See also Gomulkiewicz, 12 Geo Mason L Rev at 701 (cited in note 86) (describing “[l]ack of leadership by [ ] senior management” as a barrier to innovative contract
drafting).
259 Interview with Michal Rosenn (cited in note 101).
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to lawyers at the IAC Group (which owns or owned Ask.com,
Match.com, Vimeo, and other new economy firms), terms of use
are hard to read and complex because they must be: lawyers are
trying to solve worldwide compliance issues, responding to evolving business goals and technical modalities, while permitting
firms maximum flexibility to maneuver in fields like privacy.
Given that “the working assumption is that no one is reading the
TOS,” it would be a Sisyphean task to spend significant efforts to
encourage readership of documents that must, by their nature, be
hideously complex.260 Michael Cheah, Vimeo’s general counsel, lamented: “You can do as much education as you want on terms,
people aren’t going to sit down and read them.”261
This account, then, suggests that the barrier to innovation
isn’t lawyers’ training or risk aversion—or at least not primarily
those factors. Rather, firms innovate and create terms that look
functional when it is in their interest to do so. The set of cases in
which those conditions hold is not zero, but it might be quite
small.
C.

Relational Contracts of Adhesion

With this account of why and when precatory terms work in
hand, we can turn our attention to considering how our case studies fit in the existing taxonomy of contract law and practice. To
wildly oversimplify, that taxonomy can be thought of as starting
with the nineteenth century’s classical contract: a fully negotiated
contract between equally situated individuals. From that root
came two great branches. The first is the modern commercial contract, marked by negotiation ex ante (at least some of the time),
and reputationally determined performance goals and norms.262
Such contracts are intended to be read and to govern behavior
while the parties’ relationship remains intact.
The second branch is the classic consumer contract of adhesion.263 Consumer contracts are not negotiated ex ante, are offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and (as I describe) function as discretionary options.264 The drafters of such contracts are aware
260

Interview with Ed Ferguson and Michael Cheah (cited in note 83).
Id.
262 See text accompanying notes 51–53.
263 For an influential analysis of this type of contract, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum L Rev 629, 631–32
(1943) (describing the rise of consumer contracts of adhesion).
264 See text accompanying notes 69–70.
261
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that their terms will be unread by their mass adherents. The audience is ex post—largely for courts and secondarily for aggrieved
consumers.
One way to think about the case studies in this Article is that
they have taken on attributes of both traditional consumer and
commercial contracts. This can be seen along a number of dimensions, as the following table illustrates:
TABLE 1: CONTRACT ATTRIBUTES

Individually
negotiated or
adhesive
Number of
counterparties
Duration
Reading expected?
Merchants or
Consumers
How are terms
usually enforced?
Sharing of
benefits and
burdens

Consumer
Contracts
Adhesive

Commercial
Contracts
Negotiated

Millions

A handful

Platform Case
Studies
Some informal
drafting but
then deployed
adhesively
Millions

Largely one-off
purchases
No

Relationship

Relationship

Yes

Yes

Merchants

Both

Both

Exclusion and ex
post litigation
defenses
No

Reputational
markets à selfpolicing
Yes

Exclusion and
internalization
Yes (in theory)

These categories are largely self-explanatory with a few
exceptions:
• Merchants or consumers: Categorizing platform counterparties as consumers or merchants may be one of the key legal
and political questions of the digital age. It doesn’t seem fair to
conclude that Etsy’s 1.9 million sellers265 (for example) are all
“merchants” in the same way that firms in traditional consumer
contracts are. For one, they may be buyers and sellers of items

265 See About Etsy (Etsy, Sept 31, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/LE7X-KW9U (describing 1.9 million “active sellers” on the platform).
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simultaneously, and for another, they may be hobbyists or individuals earning their livelihood. This is even truer for Tumblr,
which attracts both professionals and those who simply seek to
express themselves. Now, obviously, heavy users on each site are
probably more like traditional merchants than they are like oneoff consumers, but it’s not at all clear that such users were the
exclusive audience for the revised tone and feel of terms that I
discuss.
• How are terms enforced: Like ordinary consumer contracts,
platform terms work in part through exclusion: users are thrown
off sites for bad behavior, and terms (filtered through moderators
and complaint systems) enable those sanctions to proceed
smoothly. But unlike consumer contracts, the evidence I adduce
suggests that platform contracts also succeed because at least
some of their adherents read them, talk about them, and use them
in dealing with one another. That is, the terms become a part of
the reputational market on the platform.
• Sharing of benefit and burdens: This is a shorthand way of
asking how one-sided the contracts are: Do they grasp each advantage for the drafting party, or do the mass counterparties retain sufficient negotiating power to make the resulting exchanges
moderately “fair”? Here, it is difficult to know with precision. I
show that firms have forgone some opportunities to exculpate
liability and control litigation risk. At the same time, the firms do
share some of the benefits of the platform with their users, in that
they permit users to monetize their property and do not take ownership in it. Whether platform firms generally are largely benign
is outside the scope of this Article, but I return later to the question of just how “fair” their contracts in fact are.266
What to make of this mix? A word that came up repeatedly
in my conversations with the lawyers who drafted these contracts
was relationship. The contracts were intended to embody trust
between the firm and its users, to demonstrate that the terms
were aligned with the firms’ long-term mission, and to encourage
users to continue to participate in the platform.267 The firms had
no desire to sue any of their users for violations of the terms. At
most, they wished to weed out from their sites users who were
disruptive to the platform’s functioning, but otherwise they hoped
266

See notes 283–86 and accompanying text.
For an example of a similar practice, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure
and the New Economy, 8 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 1, 46–47 (2012) (reporting that the CBS
general counsel wanted lawyers who could design a “relational structure”).
267
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to create a set of rules that would be self-policing.268 This reads,
in many ways, like an attempt to create a classic relational contract, counterpoised to the ordinary discrete consumer contract.269
As with the traditional description of relational contracting,
the governing contracts here are “not designed to create incentives for performance and breach primarily through the prospect
of court-imposed monetary damages.”270 Performance is rather
governed largely by users internalizing a set of rules created
through brand alignment, informality, and interpersonal norms
of reciprocity and fairness (thus, Bumble says, “[W]e’ve worked
hard on our creation, so scraping or replicating any part of the
App without our prior consent is expressly prohibited”).271 As
Professor Oliver Hart has explained, reciprocity is a strong norm
when the participants clearly understand what they are getting
and giving:272 Etsy’s need to clarify the intellectual property rights
that its platform takes (or doesn’t) thus was a crucial part of its
reform process.
When soft norms fail, even in relational contracting systems,
firms retain the ability to use a heavier hand. Here, our case
study firms start their sanctions with rating-based complaint systems, escalate to suasion by site moderators, and finally exclude
bad users from the marketplace entirely. But those systems can
be overstrained: as the case studies show, firms innovated here in
part because their customer service representatives needed a
break from noncompliant users, who needed to be better convinced that they were in a relationship of trust and reciprocity. In
this way, we can see the relational contracts here as solving a
268 An analogy is to online dispute resolution systems, like that of Wikipedia, which
seek to weed out problematic users but otherwise motivate productive editors to continue
to dispute (and generate content for the platform). See David A. Hoffman and Salil K.
Mehra, Wikitruth through Wikiorder, 59 Emory L J 151, 170–74 (2009) (exploring
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution system).
269 For an analysis of this distinction, see Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An
Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations 10 (Yale 1980) (distinguishing discrete contracts
from relational ones). For an early, aspirational version of relational contracting in digital
spaces, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection: Toward Development of
Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy Contracting Norms, in Anupam Chander,
Lauren Gelman, and Margaret Jane Radin, eds, Securing Privacy in the Internet Age 73, 81–
82 (Stanford 2008). But see Bar-Gill and Davis, 84 S Cal L Rev at 35 (cited in note 7) (noting
that consumer contracts are sometimes designed to govern long-term relationships).
270 Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J Legal Analysis 561, 562 (2015).
271 Bumble Terms and Conditions (cited in note 111).
272 See Oliver Hart, Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the
Firm, 75 Economica 404, 407 (2008).
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business problem: they needed to keep users engaged, on task,
and willing to contribute to a larger platform economy.
But platform users aren’t ordinary relational contracting
counterparties.273 Etsy and Tumblr’s creators are heterogeneous
and myriad: ordinary norms and reputational sanctions alone can
only weakly police behavior.274 From the case studies, it seems
clear that one important way that these contracting systems work
is through consumer service teams, who use the terms themselves
to remind users of the rules. This is not the traditional relational
contracting setting in which the rules are (at best) the beginning
of the conversation.275 Platform sites are in a repeated, socially
rich, virtual relationship with each of their users.276
Moreover, the contracts here, though focus-grouped ex ante,
are formally adhesive: individual Etsy or Kickstarter users
simply cannot negotiate their own deals with each other or with
the site. That’s true in part because terms of use are mass agreements, binding not hundreds on a local or regional bourse but millions, worldwide, on the internet. It would be inconceivable for
platform firms to come to separate deals with each of their users,
or even talk about the deals in detail with a fraction of them. Conventionally, “[c]ontracts of adhesion and relational contracts are
in some ways opposite to each other,”277 making even the term
“relational contracts of adhesion” a difficult one.

273 For analyses of typical relational contracting counterparties, see Amy J. Schmitz,
Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 Pepperdine L Rev 279,
290–300 (2012) (describing the characteristics of consumers); Bernstein, 99 Mich L Rev at
1762–64 (cited in note 53) (describing relational contract relationships in the cotton industry); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115, 130–32 (1992) (same, in the diamond industry); Macaulay, 28 Am Sociological Rev at 65–67 (cited in note 53).
274 See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 140 (cited in note 273) (explaining that reputational bonds are generally effective only in homogeneous groups).
275 For more on the role of enforceability (however defined), see Andrew A. Schwartz,
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 Yale J Reg 313, 324–26
(2011) (arguing that legal enforceability is necessary for a contract to have value and that
relational contracts are a viable alternative to legal enforceability only if the parties have
a personal, long-term relationship).
276 See Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet
Retail Contracting, 108 Colum L Rev 984, 1011 (2008) (“Although many of the customers are
repeat customers, there is by definition almost no opportunity online for the kind of personal
interaction that characterizes relational contracting as it is commonly understood.”); F. Scott
Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory L J 327, 356 (2006) (noting that
relational contracting is effective “within homogeneous communities”).
277 Aditi Bagchi, Parallel Contract, 75 U Pitt L Rev 139, 142 (2013).
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Thus, Etsy, Tumblr, and Kickstarter (and to a lesser extent,
Airbnb) may illustrate a genuinely novel contracting form. Their
end-user contracting framework is designed to build on an existing relationship and generate trust by the users toward the firm
and toward each other. But it does so on a massive scale through
terms of use that are embedded into the firm’s existing trade
dress. Users can participate in the terms’ creation, or at least are
invited to do so in a way that makes them feel included. But the
terms themselves are nonnegotiable and are enforced against the
users not by the threat of suit but by exclusion from the market.
The case study contracts aren’t just accomplishing the ordinary
goals of conveying information and setting up rules. They are doing that, but they are also marketing materials, demonstrating
values the firms think are useful—that is, we’re progressive, nonconformist, funny, hip, young, and above all, not evil.
D. The Future of Contract Regulation (and Regulation by
Contract)
Authors selling normative prescriptions standing on a limited number of case studies should be distrusted. This Section,
cognizant of the strength of the evidence on which it rests, will
make two observations and then pose a series of hopefully orientating questions about the nature of future research into the functioning of mass contracts.
First, an implicit premise of this Article is that contract theorists should treat precatory terms and exculpatory terms as distinct objects of study. To date, they have not, all but ignoring precatory terms.278 But if contract (particularly consumer contract)
theory is to become realistic, we ought to revisit our accounts of
contracting to deal with the fact that many terms in adhesive
mass-market contracts purport to extend the performance obligation beyond the point of purchase, and yet are obviously not intended to have legal force.
The evidence I adduce tends to discredit accounts that deem
these terms to be inert as a product of a monopolistic bar’s failure
to innovate. Precatory terms do have multiple functions. The
most obvious one—options to enable the firm to manage unruly
users—is underdeveloped in the literature, which generally focuses on bad behavior by firms, not their customers. But they
278 Selection plays a role here—only exculpatory terms are typically tested in court,
leading to decisions that are the grist for law review treatments.
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also, it seems, can help to build firms’ brands and can even help
the firms to coordinate user behavior and keep users engaged
with the platform. The degree to which the latter functions have
wide appeal is highly debatable: this Article simply can tell us
that some firms, some of the time, justify costly innovation with
precisely this claim to utility.
Second, the case studies suggest that scholars might have
missed a potential way that disclosure could be made functional.
When trying to solve the problem of aversive, unread, exculpatory
terms, many modern thinkers have pushed a solution designed to
remedy cognitive problems of information overload.279 For
example, some advocate for smart disclosure mandates like warning boxes that stand out with unexpected terms,280 or graphical
warning labels for terms that are particularly unfair.281 The consumer contract problem is conceived of as a problem of mandating
the precisely right disclosures because it is assumed that firms
always lack incentives to encourage readership.
The examples of success that I provide here suggest the possible futility of even sophisticated disclosure regimes.282 Each of
the case studies suggests that terms exhort when they are
trusted, built from the ground up with buy-in from the firm’s
users, and fit with the brand. Or to put it differently, the case
studies might be thought of as a market test of the question of
how to encourage mass readership. Firms selected brands over
labels. Scholars might follow this path (through experiments or
otherwise) to see if informality and brand alignment increase
comprehension and use of terms.
This naturally leads to some potential research questions
about relational contracts of adhesion. There is much we do not
know. Are Etsy’s house rules better than eBay’s? Are Airbnb’s
better than Hyatt’s? Tumblr’s than Instagram’s? In what way?

279 See, for example, Jonathan A. Obar and Anne Oeldorf-Hirsh, The Biggest Lie on
the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social
Networking Services *23 (TPRC Working Paper, Sept 23, 2017), archived at http://
perma.cc/K9KL-UGEH (finding that readers ignored terms when joining a networking
site, in part because of “information overload”).
280 See Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at 553 (cited in note 1).
281 For a skeptical discussion, see Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More than
You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 135–37 (Princeton 2014) (discussing the failure of nutrition labels and people’s inability to understand them).
282 See id at 125 (“Simplicity . . . is usually in tension with full disclosure.”).
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These are questions that are difficult to get a handle on.283 As
Professor Calo and Alex Rosenblat have pointed out, we should
be cautious before taking the sharing economy firms at their mission statements.284 These firms are motivated to extract value
from users in whatever ways are at hand: contracts that give with
one hand may take away with another in ways invisible to external observers. I can’t conclusively determine whether the contracts I identify, which are in some ways much friendlier to users
than is the norm, are being undermined through conduct behind
the scenes. Have they created a real relationship of cooperation
and trust (the firms’ story) or merely perpetuated a narrative of
trust that enables the firms to profit from customers who have
mistakenly concluded that they are merchants rather than the
products being sold? This is a question worth further detailed
study.285
Relatedly, the theory I lay out is highly reliant on stories told
by particular firms’ lawyers, who wrote the contracts in question,
spent time justifying them to other stakeholders, and clearly have
an interest in being portrayed as both progressive and innovative.
Indeed, I gave the lawyers permission to read and edit their
quoted comments before this Article’s circulation, and any direct
quotes they believed reflected badly on them would not have survived such an inquiry. It is interesting, and perhaps telling, that
none of the general counsel I spoke to provided hard data about
readership rates or designed systems to rigorously evaluate their
modified terms’ behavioral effects.286 That is not to say that the
lawyers I spoke to were deceiving (me or themselves). Rather, to

283 Similarly difficult to determine is how courts ought to fold the design features of
such contracts into their explicit terms. See Hartzog, 60 Am U L Rev at 1653–61 (cited in
note 24) (arguing for courts to consider online contract terms’ design when evaluating
them).
284 Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1627–28 (cited in note 8) (“The sharing
economy seems poised to do a great deal of taking—extracting more and more value
from participants while continuing to enjoy the veneer of a disruptive, socially minded
enterprise.”).
285 See generally, for example, Mark Fenster, Coolhunting the Law, 12 Harv
Negotiation L Rev 157 (2007) (analyzing lawyers’ roles in crafting companies’ brands).
286 Even if data on readership rates were not illuminating, certainly such firms could
(and maybe do) have information about customer service load. See, for example, Mathew
Patterson, How Top Customer Service Teams Measure Performance (HelpScout), archived
at http://perma.cc/AU98-VQHL (describing a tool that provides real-time metrics on customer service activity).
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the extent that part of the story I tell is one of contract as marketing, we ought to be wary of taking more grand claims of behavioral influence at face value.
If we were to become convinced that relational contracts of
adhesion were influencing users to read and use their contracts,
further qualitative and quantitative study might suggest the limits of users’ acquiescence to the regulatory regime: Is buy-in
stronger with those who make more money on the site? Who have
been there longer? Who commented on the terms in their drafting? The apparent reticence of firms like Airbnb to ask probing
questions of their users suggests that not all firms will be equally
able to affect behavior or want to learn about it. Similarly, to what
extent is success here a product of rarity: If all firms’ terms looked
as cute as Etsy’s, would users become numb?
Obviously, only a few firms have user terms that look anything like the ones I’ve studied. Why is that? Are relational contracts of adhesion limited to circumstances in which users are
also merchants? To firms pressed on the problem when they were
small enough to care but big enough to invest? To firms born in
New York City? Near Union Square? A research project that
looked at those firms that did not innovate, though they had the
opportunity to do so, might help to provide clarity on these issues.
CONCLUSION
Channeling user behavior is one of the mission-critical tasks
in the sharing economy. Firms have spent enormous energy on
that project, mostly in the form of behavioral nudges287 and software like Digital Rights Management.288 Technological evangelists are even starting to promise that “smart contracts” based on
decentralized ledger technology—a set of tools and protocols that
exchange and verify data without centralized intermediaries—
can solve certain problems in the consumer space.289
287 See Calo and Rosenblat, 117 Colum L Rev at 1650–54 (cited in note 8) (explaining
how firms can “nudge” consumers to behave in ways beneficial to the firm).
288 Digital rights management (DRM) allows parties to control access to information
and to track and monitor content. Rebecca Wexler, The Private Life of DRM: Lessons on
Privacy from the Copyright Enforcement Debates, 17 Yale J L & Tech 368, 373 (2015). In
Europe, the Pirate Party system was built on opposition to DRM technologies. See id at
379–81 (describing the Pirate Party’s foundational orientation against DRM restrictions);
Rub, 103 Va L Rev at 1215–16 (cited in note 13) (exploring DRM as an alternative to contractual control).
289 See Alexander Savalyev, Contract Law 2.0: Smart Contracts as the Beginning of
the End of Classic Contracts Law, 26 Info & Communications Tech L 116, 123 (2017) (“But
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Notwithstanding these sophisticated techniques, firms continue to deploy benumbing terms of use to users who do not read
them.290 Those terms continue to purport to govern user behavior.
Their regulations can be bizarre; for example, the fine print “tells”
you not to drive Beyoncé home from a concert in your Zipcar or
trade on insider tips when registering for your honeymoon.291 Indeed, so odd does the project of governing the public with contract
terms seem that no one has written carefully about it. Precatory
and executory terms are seen as part of the same story of uncreative exploitation.
It’s dangerous to generalize from case studies, let alone ones
that valorize their subjects. This Article can merely claim that not
all mass-market contracts look the same, and they might not
function identically, either. Some might be changing user behavior by drawing on practices (of reciprocity, informality, and trust)
traditionally sourced to individualized, negotiated, off-line deals.
The challenge going forward is to understand better what role the
law and legal institutions play in creating innovation around such
relational contracts of adhesion.

in contrast to classic contract where trust is put in the personality of the other party to
the contract, in Smart contracts such trust is put in the computer algorithm standing behind the agreement.”); Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer
Protection, 71 Wash & Lee L Rev Online 35, 38 (2014) (defining smart contracts as “automated programs that transfer digital assets”).
290 Indeed, some firms may be attempting to discriminate in favor of the rare borrowers who read terms, who (at least according to press reports) may be better credit risks.
See Steve Lohr, Banking Start-Ups Adopt New Tools for Lending (NY Times, Jan 18,
2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/technology/banking-start-ups-adopt
-new-tools-for-lending.html (visited Apr 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing
Earnest, a lending firm that generates risk profiles for borrowers based in part on how
long they spend reading the online terms and conditions of the loan).
291 Users of Honeyfund, a honeymoon crowdfunding site, are prohibited from “posting,
providing, transmitting, or otherwise making available any information which violates
regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, or that of any securities exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange.” Terms of Use (Honeyfund, Nov
11, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/MRP3-9A3S.

